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Errors in health care are one of the leading causes of death and injury in this 
country, requiring new methods for evaluating and promoting quality in health care 
services. Concern for patient safety, the foundation for quality services, has prompted 
national initiatives to examine the most basic premise for health care providers: Do no 
harm to the patient. Few of these initiatives have examined errors from the perspective of 
those who have been sanctioned for their errors. This descriptive, exploratory study 
utilized a survey methodology to examine the perceptions of 62 registered nurses (RNs) 
who had been sanctioned by a board of nursing to ascertain categories of practice errors 
and identify individual, health care team, patient, and system threats that contributed to 
an error and/or patient harm. The Threat and Error Management Model (TEMM) was 
utilized as a framework for examining the phenomena that promote or hinder patient 
safety. Using a modified version of the Taxonomy of Error Root Cause Analysis of 
Practice-Responsibilities (TERCAP) instrument, sanctioned RNs selected types of errors 
associated with a breakdown in their nursing practice. In addition, they identified factors 
that contributed to their errors, including individual, health care team, patient, and system 
 vi
threats. Associations between the levels of patient harm and types of error were 
examined. Two open-ended questions provided an opportunity for the participants to 
describe changes in their practice since the error event. System and health care team 
factors were the most common items selected as contributing to the error events, while 
individual factors were the least often selected items. Two types of errors, clinical 
evaluation and attentiveness/surveillance, were significantly related to the level of harm 
to patients. Given the opportunity to discuss individual factors through open-ended 
questions, responses were comprehensive and many were related to issues with trust. 
Recommendations for nursing theory, policy, practice, education, and research are 
reviewed. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
 
STUDY PURPOSE  
The purpose of this descriptive, exploratory study was to examine the perceptions 
of registered nurses (RNs) who had been sanctioned by a board of nursing to ascertain 
categories of practice errors and identify individual, health care team, patient, and system 
threats that contributed to an error and/or patient harm. The Threat and Error 
Management Model (TEMM) was utilized as a framework for examining the phenomena 
that promote or hinder patient safety. Using a modified version of the Taxonomy of Error 
Root Cause Analysis of Practice-Responsibilities (TERCAP) Instrument, sanctioned RNs 
selected types of errors associated with a breakdown in their nursing practice. In addition, 
they identified factors that contributed to their errors, including individual, health care 
team, patient, and system threats. Associations between the levels of patient harm and 
types of error were examined. Understanding the perspective of these nurses should 
provide a close look at the error process and support the development of new knowledge 
about the multidimensional contributions to errors. 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Errors in health care are one of the leading causes of death and injury in this 
country, requiring new methods for evaluating and promoting quality in health care 
services (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality [AHRQ], 2000, 2001; Institute of 
Medicine [IOM], 2000, 2004). Concern for patient safety, the foundation for quality 
services, has prompted national initiatives to examine the most basic premise for health 
care providers: Do no harm to the patient. Instances of injuries and death remain high and 
costly even though health care indices of quality have been used extensively in the health 
 2
care arena (AHRQ, 2000; IOM, 2000, 2001, 2004; Leape, 1997). For example, based on 
an extrapolation of all hospital admissions in the United States in 1997, it is estimated 
that there are between 44,000 and 98,000 deaths annually as the result of medical errors 
(IOM, 2000). Furthermore, the estimated cost of adverse events—including lost income, 
lost household production, disability, and health care costs—totaled between $17 billon 
and $29 billion, with health care costs constituting more than half the expenditures (IOM, 
2000). Medication errors are a type of medical error, and evidence reveals that they are 
costly. For example, one study suggests that nearly 2% of patients admitted to a hospital 
were involved in a preventable adverse drug event, resulting in an average cost of $4,700 
per admission or $2.8 million a year for a 700-bed teaching hospital (IOM, 2000). 
Evidence also identifies surgical errors as a problem. In a study conducted to estimate the 
costs of errors in surgeries, medical claims for 22,477 surgeries in 1,725 hospitals were 
reviewed for the AHRQ’s Patient Safety Indicators, which identifies 14 types of 
preventable adverse events. Using multivariate analysis, the researchers found that the 
average difference in cost between those patients who had a potentially preventable 
adverse event and those who did not was an additional $35,617. Of these costs, 20% 
($6,998) was attributed to the actual adverse event. In addition, patients who experienced 
adverse events were 3% more likely to die within 90 days than those without adverse 
events (Encinosa & Hellinger, 2005). 
The depth and breadth of the health care errors is such that national and state 
policy initiatives are being implemented to establish a regulatory framework for 
solutions. At the state level, coalitions between the health care industry, professional 
associations, and patient advocacy groups are being formed to address common goals and 
strategies to promote patient safety and reduce error rates (Comden, 2002). Legislators at 
the national level are also responding. In July of 2005, President Bush signed into law the 
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Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (GovTrack.us, 2005). This law 
mandates the establishment and maintenance of a network of standardized patient safety 
data centers to serve as a repository for confidential information about health care errors 
in order to analyze and promote new knowledge about the problem. Called Patient Safety 
Organizations (PSOs), the purpose of these data centers is to compile anonymous data to 
analyze trends and make recommendations regarding common factors involved in errors. 
Organizations can report errors to the PSOs with non-identifiable provider information. 
Many believe that the anonymity of the data will decrease barriers to reporting and 
subsequently provide more complete information to enhance methods to decrease 
medical errors (Kristin Hellquist, personal communication, April 10, 2006). The new law 
mandates that a report to Congress is made each year to inform policy makers of research 
findings that may provide direction on methods to mitigate the problem (GovTrack.us, 
2005). 
Historically, the health care industry investigated error commission within the 
context of quality improvement and risk management. Although quality-control activities 
have been incorporated into the majority of health care organizations, the industry has 
been resistant to examining the frequency and severity of medical errors and adverse 
events (RAND Corporation, 2005). Concerns about legal liability, the complexity of the 
problem, and lack of scientific evidence about the etiology and resolution to medical 
errors contribute to this resistance (AHRQ, 2000, 2001; Cohen, 2000; IOM, 2000, 2004; 
RAND Corporation, 2005; Spath, 2000). However, with the release of the 2000 IOM 
report To Err Is Human, which provided evidence outlining the considerable costs of 
medical error, endeavors to improve patient safety were propelled to the forefront of a 
national political and research agenda. The IOM report issued a call to action and 
outlined four strategies to prioritize patient safety initiatives, including setting a national 
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agenda to develop the leadership and knowledge needed for resolution of the issue; 
instituting a national reporting system for identification and analysis of medical errors; 
establishing standards for health care providers and organizations with oversight and 
input from regulators, accrediting bodies, and consumer groups; and implementing 
cultures of safety within health care systems (IOM, 2000; RAND Corporation, 2005). 
These policy initiatives reflect a macro approach to the issue of health care errors 
and patient safety. A micro approach reflecting the patient/family perspective also should 
be examined. Surveys of health care consumers about their experiences with errors in 
their health care have produced alarming results. The National Patient Safety Foundation 
found that 42% of respondents to a survey it conducted reported being affected by a 
health care error, either personally or through a friend or relative. Of these respondents, 
32% indicated that an adverse event resulting from the error had a permanent, negative 
effect on the patient’s health (AHRQ, 2000). Another survey conducted by the Kaiser 
Foundation (2004) found that 48% of the 2,012 respondents reported concern for 
themselves and their families about the safety of the medical care received, while 55% 
indicated dissatisfaction with the quality of health care in this country. Studies such as 
these provide evidence that consumers are recognizing errors in their health care 
experiences and also lack trust and confidence in the system’s ability to provide safe 
services (Serembus, Wolf, & Youngblood, 2001). 
These data suggest that consumers are concerned about medical errors. What have 
representatives of the health care industry done to respond to the issue? Historically, 
because of fears about litigation and liability, the health care industry’s legal or risk 
management departments often advised actions that were not completely open and 
transparent. For instance, legal counsel would advise against the disclosure of an error to 
the patient because of concerns about litigation (Scott, 2004). However, recent studies 
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about liability and disclosure of errors are beginning to appear in the literature, and some 
progress has been made in implementing more transparent policies to meet patient safety 
standards (Devers, Pham, & Liu, 2004; Leape & Berwick, 2005; Scott, 2004). In a study 
involving interviews with hospital leaders (Devers, Pham, & Liu, 2004), researchers 
found that the Joint Council on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations’ (JCAHO) 
Patient Safety Standards released in 2001 have spurred hospitals to implement standards 
regarding error disclosure information given to patients. Likewise, hospital leaders have 
acknowledged the impact of patient safety standards developed by other groups such as 
purchasers of health care, national and state professional associations, and safety 
foundations. One of these has taken the lead in developing patient safety standards. The 
Leapfrog Group, composed of employers, seeks to alert America’s health care industry to 
the concept that customer value, safety, and quality care will be acknowledged and 
rewarded (Leapfrog Group, 2007). As a major payer and player in the health care 
industry, this group has made significant progress in the implementation of patient safety 
standards. 
The literature reflects that health care providers and their employers should be 
cognizant of patient and professional mandates that require a transparent, ethical 
approach to identifying and resolving medical errors (Gallagher & Levinson, 2005; 
Wilson & McCaffrey, 2005; Wojcieszak, 2005). Patients and their families want to know 
about any errors that occur in their care, including how and why they happened and what 
is going to be done to remedy the problem (Wilson & McCaffrey, 2005). They want an 
honest, ethical, and accountable response to the error. This supports an approach to error 
resolution that incorporates honesty, a willingness to reveal, transparency, and making 
amends when possible (Crigger, 2004; Janove, 2006). 
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However, there are some issues with this approach that must be discussed. Health 
care providers may be fearful of personal and professional repercussions of an error. 
Barriers to an ethical response to errors include concerns about litigation, liability, and 
licensure restrictions. Developing proactive guidelines through discussions with 
colleagues and employers should support the individual health care practitioner in 
acknowledging and reporting mistakes (Gallagher & Levinson, 2005). 
In addition to concern about patients and families who suffer from adverse events, 
there should be an acknowledgment of the health care provider involved in the 
commission of the error. Health care providers may also suffer as a result of their errors, 
especially when adverse events occur (Serembus et al., 2001). Health care providers are 
licensed to promote safe, quality health care in a culture that expects perfection. When 
something goes wrong, such as an error in the performance of their duties, health care 
providers typically feel a personal and professional responsibility. Health care providers 
who have committed errors report feelings of responsibility, guilt, and depression and 
memories that stay with them for many years (Serembus et al., 2001). 
Although the problem of errors in health care affects all health care providers, this 
study is concerned with practice errors made by RNs. The role of the nurse in promoting 
patient safety is both paramount and precarious. It is paramount in that of all the members 
of the health care team, nurses are with the patient longer and are more involved in the 
patient’s ongoing care. This relationship with the patient is also precarious in that it 
places the nurse at higher risk of making medical errors (IOM, 2004). Identifying the 
phenomena that contribute to nursing errors is in the beginning stages of research, and 
this study promotes new knowledge by gaining the perspective of nurses who have been 
involved in practice errors. 
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RNs have a contract with society to provide human caring without self interest 
and with moral and ethical integrity (Sullivan & Benner, 2005). Through the educational 
process and subsequent professional development, nurses learn how to comply with this 
contract and the associated standards. Boards of nursing play a critical role in providing 
assurance that nurses meet these standards through the development of binding 
requirements for practitioner competence and remediation. 
The literature suggests that we live in a culture where health professionals are 
expected to be perfect with no instances of error (IOM, 2004; Kaiser Foundation, 2001). 
Licensing boards are viewed by some as reinforcing the myth of clinical perfection and, 
in fact, the IOM has recommended that nursing regulatory boards across the country 
develop processes for distinguishing errors caused by human factors from errors caused 
by intentional misconduct and negligence (IOM, 2004). Because state boards of nursing 
have substantial data about nursing errors, exploring their data to investigate new models 
related to the nurse’s role in the commission of medical errors is timely. Because this 
study utilizes the TEMM as a framework and the modified TERCAP instrument as a data 
collection tool, the perspectives of RNs who have been sanctioned by a board of nursing 
will enhance an understanding of personnel who work most closely with patients and are 
most vulnerable to error commission. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• What is the demographic profile of RNs sanctioned by the BNE? 
• What are the incidences of individual, health care team, patient, and system 
threats and types of errors as reported by sanctioned nurses? 
• What are the incidences of the level of harm to the patient as reported by 
sanctioned nurses? 
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• What relationships exist between the types of errors and the level of harm to the 
patient as reported by sanctioned nurses? 
• What changes in practice do RNs sanctioned by the BNE describe after the error 
event, and what suggestions do they have for other nurses in preventing error 
events? 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
There are many definitions of patient safety, and most focus on the prevention and 
mitigation of errors during the delivery of patient care (Chang, Schyve, Croteau, 
O’Leary, & Loeb, 2003; IOM, 2000; National Patient Safety Foundation, n.d.; Powell, 
Haskins, & Sanders, 2005). However, the prevention and mitigation of errors and their 
relationship to patient safety has not been fully explored, and a framework for research 
and theory development is needed (IOM, 2001, 2004). To develop effective programs 
that promote best practices, reduce errors, and prevent iatrogenic injury to or the death of 
patients, theoretical questions and propositions should be examined (Reed, Shearer, & 
Nicoll, 2004). Using a theoretical approach to define and differentiate the phenomena 
will assist researchers in determining what questions to ask and what methods to use 
(Meleis, 1997). 
The investigation of phenomena that promote or hinder patient safety is relatively 
new to the health care industry (AHRQ, 2000; Helmreich, 2000a; IOM, 2000; Mark, 
Hughes, & Jones, 2004; Helmreich & Sexton, 2004). The development of this knowledge 
lends itself to exploratory research in patient safety. Consequently, studies may be 
descriptive in nature and applicable for a starting point in hypothesis generation or theory 
development (Polit & Beck, 2004). Pertinent to a framework for safety in nursing would 
be the inclusion of models or theories derived from behavioral science, human factor 
analysis, high-reliability analysis, and organizational analysis (IOM, 2004). 
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Of interest and importance for this study is an exploration of a model derived 
from Human Factors Theory that has been utilized in the aviation industry and is 
currently being studied for its applicability to health care (IOM, 2004; Helmreich, 2000a, 
2000b; Thomas & Houston, 2005; Thomas, Sexton, & Helmreich, 2004). Human Factors 
Theory is concerned with the human interface with technology, tools, automation, and 
complex systems (National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], 2003). 
Robert Helmreich, a human factors expert, has been utilizing this framework to study 
safety in aviation and, more recently, safety in health care. His research has been pivotal 
in the development of a model that has promoted the aviation industry’s success in safety. 
Because of this success, Helmreich’s TEMM is worth exploring for applicability in the 
health care industry and more specifically in the practice of nursing. 
Threat and Error Management Model 
In the early 1980s, Helmreich and his research team developed the Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) program to teach pilots, air traffic controllers, and flight 
attendants an approach to error reduction. Principal components of the program included 
a systems approach to safety, team building to promote communication, an evaluation of 
human factors such as fatigue and stress in errors, and lastly the influences of the 
organizational culture on the perception and resolution of errors (Helmreich, 1996). In an 
effort to refine the CRM program, Helmreich, influenced by the research of James 
Reason, changed the focus of CRM from error avoidance to error management, 
acknowledging that human error is ubiquitous and inevitable (Helmreich, 1996; 
Helmreich, Willhelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001). This shift from avoidance to 
management reflected an acknowledgement of the limitations (threats) of both humans 
and systems in error commission. Error management was developed as a mechanism to 
mitigate the ever-present threats that occur in highly complex systems. Helmreich used 
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inductive methods to develop the TEMM, including confidential surveys of pilots, non-
punitive incident reporting systems, and direct observation of cockpit crews (Helmreich, 
2000a). Data were taken directly from pilot-identified issues and pilot-derived 
terminology. This inductive process differentiates the TEMM from Human Factors 
Theory, which utilizes a cognitive modeling approach (Harper & Helmreich, 2003). 
Acknowledgement of the aviation industry’s success in using the model to 
identify, manage, and reduce errors was noted by the members of the IOM, who directed 
the health care industry to take note (IOM, 2000). Although originally applied in a 
different context, the model is unusually broad in its coverage of a wide range of factors 
that directly or indirectly play into errors and mishaps. The model is potentially valuable 
for its holistic and metaphorical approach in the quest for cause and effect or the 
convergence of factors that produce undesirable health care outcomes or errors. 
Accordingly, this study utilizes Helmreich’s model for its heuristic value in identifying 
factors that might otherwise go undetected in the health care arena. 
Appendix A depicts the relationship between the major constructs within the 
TEMM. Appendix B is a more detailed picture of the model and provides concepts to 
describe each construct. The model is recursive and intertwined, reflecting the dynamic 
nature of the phenomena of error (Helmreich, 2000b). There are two basic processes in 
the model. The first process is an analysis and categorization of errors leading to the 
event. This component provides the analysis of errors that is customary in reviewing 
morbidity and mortality. The second process consists of the analysis of the threats that 
contributed to the error and the behaviors utilized to manage the threat and error. Every 
error may resolve itself, be successfully or unsuccessfully managed, or precipitate further 
errors (Helmreich, 2000a, 2000b; Harper & Helmreich, 2003). 
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Latent and Overt Threats  
Helmreich (2000a, p. 784) defines threats as “factors that increase the likelihood 
of errors.” The TEMM establishes that there are latent or hidden threats and overt or 
immediate threats. Latent threats, as identified in the model, include national, 
organizational, and professional culture; scheduling; and vague policies. Overt threats 
include environmental, organizational, individual, team/crew, and patient factors. 
Gaining an understanding of latent and overt threats is clearly important for exploring 
patient safety and the relationship between error and safety. This is because, historically, 
the evaluation of errors has been focused on the more visible aspect of error commission, 
such as the competency or liability of an individual practitioner, and not on the less 
obvious factors that present threats to patient safety. James Reason (1990) was one of the 
first cognitive psychologists to propose that it is latent factors that most often contribute 
to error commission. In the TEMM, an evaluation of the context surrounding the error 
contributes to an analysis of latent threats, including expected and unexpected threats 
(Helmreich, 2000b). Latent threats are hidden in an organizational system and become 
visible only when combinations of factors break down the system’s defenses (Reason, 
2000). The TEMM reiterates that these threats are existing conditions that are not easily 
identifiable and predispose situations leading to errors (Helmreich, 2000b). Within a 
health care system, latent threats are usually influenced by management and include 
factors such as resource allocation, culture, and leadership. Aiken’s research on the effect 
of staffing on nursing errors is an example of how a latent threat can impact patient safety 
(Aiken, Clarke, Sloane, Sochaiski, & Silber, 2002). 
Overt threats, on the other hand, are very apparent and include factors that are 
visible, obvious, and very close to the frontline worker (IOM, 2004). Because overt 
threats are more apparent than latent threats, they are typically the focus of error 
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management. Individual practitioner factors that may lead to errors include cognitive 
mistakes, fatigue, and, rarely, lack of regard or concern. Environmental factors that could 
become overt threats include the architectural layout of a hospital unit, increased patient 
admissions due to seasonal variations, and inadequate team communication. 
Error  
In the TEMM, errors are defined as “what was done wrong” (Helmreich, 2000b). 
This is a simplistic definition, yet it is the simplicity itself that facilitates utilization for 
many different types of environments. The TEMM portrays a process of error events that 
describes how the error progressed. For example, “error detection and response” reflects 
the level of the health care practitioner’s awareness of the problem. “Induced patient 
state” reflects how the patient is affected by the error. “Management of the patient state” 
describes what was done to monitor and oversee the process that initiated or facilitated 
the error. “Adverse” and “inconsequential” outcomes describe how the error affected the 
patient. 
Threat and Error Management Strategies and Countermeasures 
Observational data of 3,800 flights provided evidence that specific management 
behaviors are essential in helping recognize and manage threats and errors (Thomas, 
2000). Helmreich (1998, 2000b) uses the phrase “threat and error management” to 
describe how mistakes are handled. Helmreich developed the CRM to implement certain 
behaviors to manage and counter threats and errors (Helmreich, 1996). These activities, 
called behavior markers, include briefings, monitoring, and cross-checking that are 
pertinent to the aviation industry. 
Threat and error management strategies such as behavior markers provide 
deliberate, evidence-based activities that help to counter the effects of error commission. 
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Specifically, error management involves the use of data to understand the etiology of 
error, outline appropriate behaviors to reduce the incidence of error, and minimize the 
consequences of errors that do occur (Helmreich, 1998). 
Applicability to Health Care and Patient Safety 
The TEMM is being utilized in health care because of the belief that the model 
can assist in understanding the nature and management of errors in a complex 
environment (Helmreich, 2000b). Helmreich hypothesizes that the model will promote an 
understanding of how threats, errors, and their management interact and affect patient 
safety outcomes (Helmreich, 2000a). Research is underway to further develop the model. 
Thomas and his colleagues at The University of Texas are utilizing the model to evaluate 
whether behavioral markers that counter threats and errors in the aviation industry are 
pertinent to the health care industry (Thomas & Helmreich, 2002; Thomas et al., 2004). 
In addition, the model is being utilized at medical schools and hospitals as a framework 
for patient safety research (Helmreich, 2000a; Health Alliance Safety Partnership, 2005; 
Musson & Helmreich, 2004; Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000; Thomas et al., 2004; 
Helmreich & Sexton, 2004). 
In this study, the model was used to direct the research questions, guide data 
collection, and direct data analysis in ascertaining individual, health care team, patient, 
and system threats relating to nursing errors as perceived by nurses involved in those 
errors. Examining these variables is important because recent patient safety literature de-
emphasizes individual contributions to errors and prioritizes a focus on the examination 
of latent threats through systems analysis (Helmreich, 2000a; IOM, 2000, 2004; Reason, 
1990). However, Benner argues that a systems approach to error resolution cannot 
replace professional judgment and good practice found within the individual health care 
professional and the health care team (Benner, Malloch, Sheets, Bitz, Emrich, & Thomas, 
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2006). This thinking is mirrored by the Citizen Advocacy Center (CAC), a not-for-profit 
organization composed of public members who serve on health care regulatory and 
oversight agencies, which has prioritized provider competency and the effect on patient 
outcomes such as safety (2000). 
In the TEMM, individual as well as health care team, patient, and organizational 
factors are all included in the model. This provides an opportunity to examine all four 
variables. Of importance for this study is the availability of an instrument specifically 
developed for capturing nursing errors that utilizes a framework of similar concepts 
identified as threats in the TEMM. This instrument is the TERCAP and was developed by 
the National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN). By modifying the TERCAP 
for utilization in this study, core concepts within the TEMM will be identified by nurses 
who have been involved in nursing practice errors that led to a sanction from a board of 
nursing. 
By using the TEMM and the TERCAP, this study may provide evidence that 
informs pertinent stakeholders about the relationship between types of errors and patient 
outcomes. Further studies could develop into a full program of research. For instance, 
though not explored in this study, one might investigate the types of behavioral markers 
that are important for the nursing profession. Once identified, these behaviors could 
provide a template for the establishment of programs and protocols that are consistent, 
transparent, and standardized. This type of research is aligned with the mission of the 
AHRQ, which is to use evidence-based data for the development of guidelines, 
performance measures, educational programs, and other strategies to affect safety and 
health care quality (RAND Corporation, 2005). 
Information about types of nursing errors could also guide boards of nursing in 
developing remediation strategies that promote individual competency and safe practice. 
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Information about system threats could provide direction to health care organizations in 
the development of system-wide quality improvement activities. Examining relationships 
between overt and latent threats and patient outcomes will also contribute to further 
theory development in patient safety. In light of the terrible loss of human life and well-
being along with the fiscal impact of this problem, broadening and refining research into 
medical errors and patient safety is necessary. 
STUDY DEFINITIONS 
Sanctioned registered nurse: A licensed RN who has been reported to a board of 
nursing and has received a disciplinary order because of a nursing practice error. Texas 
Nursing Practice Act, Section 301.452, Grounds for Disciplinary Action. 
Error: A breakdown in an RN’s practice that has been investigated by the Texas 
Board of Nurse Examiners (BNE) and found to have violated the Nursing Practice Act. 
Texas Nursing Practice Act, Section 301.452 (b)(10), (b)(13), Grounds for Disciplinary 
Action and Unprofessional Conduct, Rule 217.12 (1)(4). For the purposes of this study, it 
is the items found within the nursing error taxonomy of the modified TERCAP. 
Individual threat: Individual factors that increase the likelihood of error. For the 
purposes of this study, it is the items in the modified TERCAP that address the individual 
nurse’s factors that contributed to the error. 
Health care team threat: Factors within the health care team that increase the 
likelihood of error. For the purposes of this study, it is the items in the modified TERCAP 
that address health care team factors related to the error. 
Patient threat: Factors within the patient that increase the likelihood of error. For 
the purposes of this study, it is the items in the modified TERCAP that address the 
characteristics of the patient involved in the error. 
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System threat: Factors within the system that increase the likelihood of error. For 
the purposes of this study, it is the items in the modified TERCAP that address system 
factors related to the error. 
Patient outcome: Includes what happened to the patient and any temporary or 
permanent impairment of the physical, emotional, or psychological function or structure 
of the body or pain that required intervention. For the purposes of this study, it is the 
items in the modified TERCAP that address patient outcomes. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Based on the TEMM, assumptions stem from the relationships among the model’s 
concepts and provide guidance for the research study. First, it is assumed that errors 
occur while caring for patients and that RNs are among the health care providers who 
make these errors. It is also assumed that the RNs in the sample who received a sanction 
from the board of nursing did make an error while caring for a patient. The third 
assumption is that factors exist that pose threats to patient safety and may contribute to 
error commission by the individual RN, the health care team, the patient, and the health 
care system. The fourth assumption is that errors can be managed by identifying 
individual, system, health care team, and patient contributing factors. The fifth 
assumption is that the analysis of errors will broaden knowledge about error commission, 
which may promote patient safety. Finally, it is assumed that RNs wanted to participate 
in the survey, that they were willing to share their thoughts, and that recall of the error 
events were as the respondents perceived them.  
LIMITATIONS 
The study utilized a unique group of RNs who had been sanctioned by a board of 
nursing and thus does not represent the total population of RNs. Furthermore, the results 
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are also limited in generalizing to the population of sanctioned RNs because the sample is 
composed of participants who reside in one state in the United States. These factors limit 
the findings of the study and may not be generalized to the general RN population (Polit 
& Beck, 2004). Another limitation is that not all errors are reported to the BNE, so the 
study’s sample does not include everyone who has committed a practice error. 
This study is a survey of RNs who have been disciplined by the BNE and thus 
may have experienced shame or embarrassment among their colleagues (IOM, 2004). 
Consequently, they may have responded in the survey by minimizing their contribution to 
the error or by maximizing external factors such as systems issues. In addition, the RNs 
may have wanted to put the disciplinary experience behind them and may not have 
responded to the survey, thus limiting the response rate. Survey research seeks to gain 
accurate information from respondents about the researcher’s area of interest. However, 
the respondent’s perception may not have been objective or accurate and may have been 
self-serving (Streiner & Norman, 2004). For example, Streiner & Norman (2004) state 
that many respondents give socially desirable responses. Finally, recall bias may have 
affected some of the participants’ responses because the disciplinary action occurred up 
to two years before the survey was sent (Streiner & Norman, 2004).  
 18
Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
INTRODUCTION 
Research regarding patient safety and medical error began to emerge in the 
literature in the late 1990s and currently is prominent (AHRQ, 2000; Helmreich, 2000a; 
IOM, 2000; Mark et al., 2004; Helmreich & Sexton, 2004). Although total quality 
management programs were fully incorporated in health care organizations by 1993, the 
industry was resistant to research on the frequency and severity of medical errors (RAND 
Corporation, 2005; Reason, 1997; Scott, 2004). Concerns about legal liability, the 
complexity of the problem, and a lack of scientific evidence about the etiology and 
resolution of medical errors were identified as factors that impeded research into error 
commission (AHRQ, 2000; Cohen, 2000; IOM, 2000, 2001, 2004; National Quality 
Forum [NQF], 2005; Spath, 2000). A culmination of events in the mid to late 1990s 
prompted a change in the contextual issues surrounding patient safety and, consequently, 
a national and comprehensive endeavor began to address errors in health care. The IOM’s 
sentinel report released in late 1999, To Err Is Human, provided a template for further 
IOM reports that critiqued the depth and breadth of issues related to quality in health care 
and its effect on medical error (IOM, 2000, 2001, 2004). With the release of the first IOM 
report, the Healthcare Research and Quality Act passed, charging the AHRQ with the 
research and promotion of patient safety and providing a budget of $50 million (RAND 
Corporation, 2005). The Quality Interagency Coordination task force was also established 
for the purpose of ensuring the coordination of all federal health care agencies to improve 
quality of care, including improving patient safety (RAND Corporation, 2005). During 
this time, federal agencies involved in health care, beginning with the U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs, began to test models used in the aviation industry that provided 
 19
direction for gaining new knowledge about the etiology and commission of errors. This 
study also utilized a model that originated in the aviation industry. Investigating the 
TEMM may provide direction for application and future research in the health care 
industry. 
To gain an understanding of the phenomena involved in error, a search of the 
literature was conducted in the Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature 
database (CINAHL), Medline, and Proquest Digital Dissertation; publications of the IOM 
and the AHRQ; and other regulatory, business, and public administration publications. 
Key words used in the search included threats, errors, patient safety, and error 
classification. After an initial review of the literature, only articles addressing scientific 
study and theory-based manuscripts were aggregated into several themes. Therefore, the 
review of the literature will first provide a discussion of what is known about error and its 
classification. Secondly, the review will provide an analysis of research related to threats 
to patient safety such as individual health care practitioner threats, health care team 
threats, patient threats, and system threats. 
TAXONOMIES AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS OF HEALTH CARE ERRORS 
The development of taxonomies and categories of errors is essential to promote a 
standardized language that provides clarity, specificity, and differentiation, thus 
facilitating measurement of the concepts. This process provides the groundwork for the 
development of research by providing specificity and definitions of concepts (LoBiondo-
Wood & Haber, 1986). The first step in this process is to describe and summarize 
information about errors, thereby reducing it to smaller, more meaningful sets of data 
(Munro, 2001). A clear, specific description and summarization of errors will promote an 
understanding of the phenomena and distinguish the concept of error from other similar 
concepts or phenomena (Blalock, 1982). Although the review of the literature reveals 
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many criteria appropriate for developing and evaluating patient safety classification 
systems, certain factors should be present in all systems. These include clear definitions, 
a description of the “who, what, when, and where” of the event, an evaluation of process 
and outcome measures, and an error classification section (AHRQ, 2001; Chang, Schyve, 
Croteau, O’Leary, & Loeb, 2005; Lilford, Mohammed, Braunholtz, & Hofer, 2003; 
Nebeker, Hurdle, Hoffman, Roth, Weir, & Samore, 2002; Wilson, Dowd, & Kralewski, 
2005). 
There are several systems that identify taxonomies or categories of error. The 
oldest system found in the literature is the Advanced Incident Monitoring System 
(AIMS), commonly known as the Australian Taxonomy. The AIMS was developed by 
the Australian Patient Safety Foundation (APSF) to “collect, classify, analyze, and learn” 
about iatrogenic harm (APSF, 2003, p. 1). The AIMS was developed in 1987 by the 
APSF when it determined that there was no comprehensive source of information about 
“things that go wrong” in health care (Runciman, 2002, p. 246). The AIMS evolved over 
the years to include the development of the Generic Reference Model, which contains 
approximately 12,500 categories to comprehensively classify national and regional 
events. These categories differentiate the events by capturing contributing factors, 
reviewing salient features, and placing the events in context (Runciman). In 2000, the 
AIMS was revised to expand its user base to include staff and patients, incorporate 
specialty and generic reporting, allow Web-based access, and collect local and national 
data (Runciman). 
The APSF developed the AIMS to serve as a repository database for collecting 
comprehensive information from many reporting systems. Although not fully embraced 
by the market, the AIMS now operates in more than 500 public and private hospitals in 
Australia and is used by 54% of the Australian Public Health System (Patient Safety 
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International, 2005). Additionally, the AIMS is being implemented in the United States, 
and Runciman suggests that it be considered as a cross-map system for utilization by the 
World Health Organization. This taxonomy may eventually provide an international 
template for the promotion of patient safety and error-reporting programs. 
In the United States, the pharmacy profession took the lead in developing a 
classification system and database about medication errors. In 1998, the U. S. 
Pharmacopoeia released MEDMARX, an anonymous, Internet-based, medication error 
reporting and classification system for all health care practitioners within subscribing 
hospitals and health care systems (Cousins, 2000). The MEDMARX medication error 
reporting system is unique in that it analyzes only one category of error, that of 
medication errors. The MEDMARX system provides a standardized taxonomy that 
collects comprehensive information about medication errors, including individual, team, 
and system factors. MEDMARX is the largest repository of medication error information 
in the United States, having accumulated more than 500,000 records from nearly 500 
participating institutions (Hicks, Cousins, & Williams, 2004). The data collected by 
MEDMARX are “uniform and comparable” (Hicks, Cousins, et al., p. 994) and support 
national, state, and local methods to study, understand, and prevent medication errors. 
Subscribing health care systems can use the database “to collect, analyze, compare, and 
disseminate their medication error data and propose practical solutions that may be 
applicable to other subscribing hospitals” (Hicks, Cousins, et al., p. 994). MEDMARX is 
a highly specialized type of taxonomy and, as such, would not be general enough to serve 
as the sole method for capturing nursing error data. However, the management of 
medication is a core component of nursing practice in many health care settings, and 
understanding the “who, what, when, and where” of adverse drug events should lead to 
improved practice. 
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MEDMARX analysis has already contributed to the development of information 
that is changing how nurses and other health care workers practice. For example, 
MEDMARX has identified that insulin products are most often cited in errors that 
resulted in harm to the patient (Hicks, Santell, Cousins, & Williams, 2004). This type of 
information can provide direction to nurses and other health care administrators in 
identifying high-frequency, high-impact errors and thus inform the facility on how to 
prioritize and allocate resources. 
A more recently developed error classification system is the Patient Safety Event 
Taxonomy (PSET) developed by JCAHO. It serves as a comprehensive “mother” 
database for smaller, more specific reporting systems to feed into, thereby providing 
mega-collection and classification (Chang et al., 2005). Although not yet fully operating, 
the system has the ability to provide a “backbone” for the common domain of patient 
safety features (Chang et al., 2005). The purpose of a large, comprehensive classification 
system such as the PSET is to facilitate the integration of existing, specialized reporting 
systems for the purpose of sorting and analyzing aggregate data (Melinda Murphy, 
personal communication, September 9, 2005). The goals of the PSET are to better 
understand errors and system failures, facilitate and disseminate information globally, 
and reduce the level of risk and harm to patients (Chang et al., 2003). Several 
methodologies were utilized in the development of the taxonomy, including the 
integration of existing taxonomies, use of a nominal workgroup process, input from 
stakeholders to investigate validity, comparative reliability testing, and an extensive 
review of the literature (Chang et al., 2005). 
Because the PSET has the capacity to serve as a global repository classification 
system, it could potentially be used to evaluate the quality of reported incidents, the 
effectiveness of reporting systems, and the success of intervention strategies (Chang et 
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al., 2005). The error classification section in the system provides an expansive view of 
the effect of the error. For instance, in conjunction with medical and psychological harm 
to the patient, legal and economic outcomes are also evaluated. The addition of legal and 
economic analysis could contribute to a broad-based policy perspective, providing a 
much more comprehensive approach to the resolution of iatrogenic injury. 
The most recently developed taxonomy is the TERCAP. This classification 
system was developed by the NSCBN, which represents all state boards of nursing in 
every jurisdiction of the United States (Benner, Sheets, Uris, Malloch, Schwed, & 
Jamison, 2002). Understanding that state boards of nursing are a rich source of data 
concerning nursing error, the NCSBN began studying the feasibility of developing a 
taxonomy of nursing errors to describe and distinguish types and sources of nursing 
errors (Malloch, 2004). Nursing errors, also called practice breakdown, are an important 
source of information to promote patient safety and should be evaluated in the context of 
the individual, the practice of nursing, and the environment (Benner et al., 2002; Malloch, 
2005). Consequently, the TERCAP was developed to collect and analyze data relating to 
discipline cases within state boards of nursing. In conjunction with classifying system 
and health care team threats to safety, the TERCAP also provides a detailed classification 
of the individual nurse’s breakdown in practice standards. Specifically, the categories of 
practice breakdown evaluate nursing error as a component of a breakdown in a nursing 
practice standard. These categories were developed by the NCSBN to reflect components 
of nursing practice that are “meaningful to aspects of good nursing practice and to the 
nurse’s moral agency, knowledge, skill” (Benner et al., 2006, p. 56). 
The preceding discussion reviewed what is known about error taxonomy 
classification systems and provided the background for the more detailed theory and 
research review related to threats that contribute to the commission of errors and pose 
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barriers to patient safety. This discussion reveals that there is a substantial effort by the 
United States and Australia to promote nomenclature for error classification. Both the 
AIMS and the PSET are global and quite comprehensive; however, the PSET has yet to 
be implemented, and the AIMS model is not prominent in the United States. Data from 
MEDMARX has been compiled into a five-year report and is providing comprehensive 
information about medication errors (Hicks, Santell, et al., 2004). The TERCAP was 
implemented in February 2007, and approximately twelve state boards are participating 
(NCSBN, 2007). The following section highlights what the literature reflects about 
threats to patient safety. 
THREATS TO PATIENT SAFETY 
Understanding the dynamics of overt and latent threats in error commission has 
recently affected how members of the health care industry view errors, particularly as 
they relate to nursing care. Historically, errors made by health care practitioners have 
been reviewed and resolved by addressing the individual’s competency and professional 
responsibility (Cohen, 2000; IOM, 2000, 2004). As the problem with medical error 
became more prominent and evidence suggested that the analysis of error should be 
approached more comprehensively through an evaluation of individual and system 
contributions, researchers looked to high-risk industries outside of the health care 
industry that had successfully addressed the issue (AHRQ, 2000; IOM, 2000, 2004). 
James Reason’s landmark book, Human Error (1990), identified that inevitable human 
factors in individuals contribute to errors, as do macro-level organizational factors. He 
framed these concepts as active errors and latent errors. Latent errors (or what he later 
described as latent conditions) are those actions made by high-ranking decision makers in 
a system that affect patient safety in insidious ways (Reason, 1990, 2000). Latent 
conditions are typically described as the system components that increase the likelihood 
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of error. Active errors (often called the sharp end of an error) are those errors made by 
providers who work directly with patients and are recognized immediately. The TEMM 
provides a more specific framework for reviewing overt and latent threats. This 
framework, in conjunction with a review of the literature and the TERCAP, provides 
common themes that should be evaluated. These themes include individual practitioner, 
patient, health care team, and organizational/system threats to patient safety. A brief 
theoretical review, as appropriate, and a description of the research are provided. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS THAT MAY POSE THREATS TO 
PATIENT SAFETY 
Numerous studies address the individual health care practitioner’s contribution to 
errors that may result in a threat to patient safety. Prominent are studies involving what is 
called “human factors.” A discussion of human factors science is presented in this study, 
as well as a review of the research concerning health care worker fatigue, which is a 
common issue found in human factors research. Other prominent areas of research 
concerning individual threats to patient safety involve the competencies of the health care 
practitioner. Finally, research will be presented that investigates unprofessional conduct 
that may impede safe patient care. 
Human Factors Science 
Human factors is a branch of science that focuses on the cognitive performances 
of humans and is an important component to error resolution in high-risk industries 
(Ergoweb.com, 2006). This science was developed through research by cognitive 
psychologists who studied the phenomena of human processes involved in errors. The 
science of human factors purports that humans will make errors for a variety of known 
and complicated reasons (IOM, 2000). James Reason (1990) developed the generic error-
modeling system (GEMS), which outlines three types of human performance: skill-based, 
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rule-based, and knowledge-based. Performance at each of these cognitive levels can be 
involved in the error commission process. For example, skill-based human performance 
allows individuals to carry out routine functions primarily in an automatic manner. Errors 
such as slips or lapses in memory are found within this domain of performance. Rule-
based behaviors apply to the activation of a relevant set of rules to provide solutions to 
problems, such as “if” (state)/“then” (action) rules. Mistakes may occur in the 
misapplication of rules to conditions that demand a different set of actions and may 
involve a deficiency in judgment in the selection of actions needed to address a problem 
(Reason, 1990, 1997). Individuals with expertise have a much larger repertoire of 
problem-solving rules than novices (Reason, 1990). Knowledge-based behaviors that lead 
to errors are due to incomplete or incorrect knowledge. These types of mistakes are 
composed of several factors, including attention given to the wrong features or not given 
to the right features, ignoring things that are not present (out of sight, out of mind), 
overconfidence, oversimplification of causality, and complexity of problem solving 
(Reason, 1990). 
The hallmark study in health care that investigated human factors in the analysis 
of error by reviewing anesthesia “mishaps” was a 1978 study by Cooper, Newbower, 
Long, and McPeek (1978). This exploratory study resulted in one of the first publications 
that reviewed the medical community’s reflection on individual practice and how less-
than-perfect behaviors relate to error and injury (Pierce, 2001). Using an inductive 
approach with specified definitions, Cooper et al. conducted interviews with 47 
anesthesiologists who described 359 preventable events. The findings of this study 
suggested that the majority of errors were related to individual error (82%), a finding that 
has been supported by a report of the MEDMARX system but refuted by many other 
researchers, who claim that system components are the primary reasons for error 
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(MEDMARX; Hicks, Santell, et al., 2004; IOM, 2000, 2004; Reason, 1990). The results 
of this early research may reflect a bias toward the individual contributions to error 
because of the lack of knowledge at the time about systems’ contribution to errors. 
However, this early work became the template for further study in health care regarding 
human error and, subsequently, anesthesia became the discipline that prompted the 
studies by others in health care (Cooper et al., 1978). 
Fatigue  
A human factor that is becoming more apparent in the health care literature is that 
of the effect of fatigue on the health care worker and its relationship to medical error. Jha, 
Duncan, and Bates (2001) conducted a review of the literature to determine evidence of 
fatigue in medical personnel and whether there were strategies that effectively mediated 
its effects. The researchers found that the literature substantiated the theory that fatigue 
did occur among medical personnel; however, there was no evidence that sleep 
depravation led to poor job performance. The researchers did find evidence in other, non–
health care industries that identified variables such as shift work, sleep hygiene, 
workplace lighting, napping, and medical therapies such as Melatonin as factors that 
affected work performance. The researchers concluded that there was nothing in the 
health care industry that supported findings cited in other industries; however, they also 
noted that there were few studies on fatigue and its impact on patient outcomes and that 
of the studies conducted, most were poorly designed. Jha and colleagues concluded that 
further research in the area was needed (Jha et al., 2001). 
A more recent descriptive study about hospital medical residents’ fatigue and 
adverse outcomes from error bridges the literature gap identified by earlier research 
(Jagsi, Kitch, Weinstein, Campbell, Hutter, & Weissman, 2005). Fatigue in hospital 
residents is an issue because they are relied upon to provide medical care after hours and 
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on the weekends. Often these residents work an exceedingly high number of hours, which 
only recently has been limited to 80 hours per week (Accrediting Council for Graduate 
Medical Education, 2005). To ascertain factors about residents and their views on patient 
safety events, a survey was conducted (no report of reliability and validity) to solicit their 
experiences with adverse events, mistakes, and near misses. According to the 689 
responses, the median number of hours slept while on overnight call was three hours. 
Eighteen percent (114) responded that a patient under their care had had an adverse event 
because of an error. Of these, 37% (42) felt they were partially responsible. Twenty-three 
percent (141) also reported near-miss incidents in which they were involved. Adverse 
events were most frequently (24%) attributed to a mistake. The most commonly 
perceived reasons for adverse events were excessive work hours (19%), inadequate 
supervision (20%), and problems with handoffs such as during change of shift (15%). A 
multivariate analysis was conducted that outlined significant predictors of adverse events. 
These predictors included working in an in-patient rotation (p < 0.001), more than 80 
duty hours in the last week (p = 0.04), and procedural specialty (p = 0.009). The 
researchers concluded that the study provides evidence that adverse events are commonly 
encountered by physicians and that residents should be queried to determine the 
occurrence of adverse events not identified in other processes (Jagsi et al., 2005). 
Research with both nurses and physicians explored attitudes toward error, fatigue 
and stress in their workplaces (Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000). Using a non-
experimental design, the researchers surveyed 1,033 health care personnel involving 
physicians, operating room (OR) nurses, and intensive care unit (ICU) nurses to ascertain 
attitudes concerning individual vulnerability to error and stress. For the study, the 
researchers modified surveys (with no report of instrument reliability and validity) from 
questionnaires developed for the aviation industry to measure attitudes toward stress, 
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fatigue, status hierarchies, leadership, and personal interaction issues. Results indicated 
that the majority of respondents did not acknowledge their limitations due to stress and 
fatigue. For instance, in response to the statement, “Even when fatigued I perform 
effectively during critical phases of patient care,” 64% of ICU nurses and 60% of OR 
nurses agreed with the statement. Physicians reported similar response rates. Responses 
to the statement, “A truly professional team member can leave personal problems behind 
when working in the OR/ICU” were similar (70% of ICU nurses and 70% of OR nurses 
agreed). The researchers surmised that these health care personnel did not acknowledge 
limitations related to stress and fatigue due to acculturation in educational programs and 
residencies. Sexton and colleagues argue that if health care providers acknowledged their 
limitations and increased the use of threat and error management strategies, the likelihood 
of error would decrease (Sexton et al., 2000). 
Competency  
An issue gaining national attention is that of continued competency in health care 
professionals (CAC, 2003). Competence is defined as “the condition of being well 
qualified, capable, and fit” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2002). For the 
health care professional, competency is gained through pre-service education, in-service 
training, and work experience (Kak, Burkeholter, & Cooper, 2001). Health professionals 
take licensing exams after completing their respective educational programs. Passing 
these exams demonstrates the individual’s basic competency and ability to enter the 
workplace and meet minimum standards of care. However, there is only a one-time 
requirement to take licensing exams. Once individuals pass the exam, they are generally 
licensed for life. Does a one-time validation of competency ensure that the practitioner 
can provide safe, quality patient care? The literature reflects that it is not sufficient and 
that ongoing, rigorous methods to enhance competency should be implemented (CAC, 
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2003). Efforts to evaluate and ensure continued competencies in health care professionals 
are inconsistent, vary from state to state, and lack evidence of effectiveness (CAC, 2003). 
In an effort to develop policies to address this issue, the IOM (2003) reported that 
ongoing, valid, and reliable competency assessment and assurance will promote safer and 
higher quality care for the public. The CAC has endorsed the IOM recommendations and 
is promulgating a national agenda to promote the competency of health care providers to 
improve patient safety and quality patient care (CAC, 2003). The CAC believes that the 
current patient safety focus weighs too heavily on system issues and too little on 
individual competency as a component of error commission (CAC, 2004). In July 2003, 
the CAC hosted a national summit at which the participants developed a conceptual 
framework for continued competency that included periodic assessment, development 
and implementation of a personal plan, documentation of the plan, and establishment of a 
method to demonstrate and evaluate competency. Several barriers were identified in 
implementing a national agenda, including legal, cultural, political, economic, and 
administrative barriers (CAC, 2003). 
To address these barriers, the CAC (2004) developed a “road map” to provide 
direction for the development of a national agenda for continued competency in health 
care professionals. Its plan is comprehensive and includes studies of competency model 
effectiveness, policy development at the national level, development of evidence-based 
standards, and reevaluation of continuing education methodologies. Its initiatives are 
currently gaining credence in the nursing regulatory arena. For instance, the NCSBN is 
conducting a practice analysis study to determine current competency requirements in the 
workplace (R. Kearney-Nunnery, personal communication, October 19, 2005). The North 
Carolina Board of Nursing is taking a leadership role in the development of new 
methodologies for ongoing assurance of competency. It has changed its requirement for 
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continuing education and now requires nurses in North Carolina to develop their own 
professional development competency plans. Once the plans are developed, the nurses 
select from several board-approved strategies to find the one that is best suited for 
helping them accomplish their plans for continued competency (North Carolina Board of 
Nursing, n.d.). 
In an exploratory study, five years of descriptive data within the MEDMARX 
system were analyzed for types of, causes of, and contributions involved in medication 
error commission (Hicks, Santell, et al., 2004). The most frequently cited error in the 
report was related to competency and was described as “performance deficit” (38%). 
However, the researchers indicate that this factor was often cited in combination with 
other causes of error such as “procedure not followed” (17.6%), “transcription 
inaccurate” (13.4%), and “documentation” (11.5%). The researchers claim that these 
findings indicate the multicausal nature of medication errors and that people who 
complete the report choose the performance deficit factor when no other explanation is 
apparent (Hicks, Santell, et al.). They suggest that a root cause analysis may be needed to 
ascertain other organizational, technical, and human factors. 
Professional certification may be a means to promote continued competency. 
Health care professionals with professional certification would be required to meet 
practice and educational requirements established through a professional credentialing 
body. However, research demonstrating competency through specialty certification has 
resulted in mixed findings. Using correlational analysis with data from the MEDMARX 
reporting system, Bulla (2003) examined the relationships among certification status 
(specialty certified vs. non-certified) and severity of medication errors using a patient 
harm index in the MEDMARX that ranks the severity of the medication errors from no 
harm to patient death. The author reported that the mean and standard deviations of 
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severity (certified nurse M = 3.67, SD = 1.225; non-certified nurse M = 3.43, SD = 
1.118) were equally spread among the groups while a t-test (t = 0.579) found there was 
no difference between the two groups in the severity of errors. The researcher concluded 
that certification status, as a form of competency, has little bearing on patient outcomes 
from medication errors (Bulla, 2003). 
Phronesis and Techne 
The importance of nursing as a synthesis of “phronesis” and “techne” has been 
explored by Benner et al. (2006). Phronesis involves ethical and clinical judgment carried 
out in a skilled practice. Techne shapes things in a standardized manner that can be called 
technique. In health care, phronesis is carried out through relationships with patients, 
while techne results in outcomes that “can be reduced to routine, predictable, and 
standardized care” (Benner et al., 2006). The importance of the discussion on phronesis 
and techne is that the recent literature on patient safety emphasizes an analysis of 
systems’ contributions in error commission and de-emphasizes individual contributions. 
System factors must be considered in the analysis of error; however, the individual 
professional mandates of phronesis and techne cannot be ignored. For example, Vincent 
(2003) identifies several factors related to the breakdown of managing care of the patient. 
Vincent calls these “care management problems,” and they involve the failure of the 
health care provider to meet professional standards. Vincent identifies care management 
problems as a failure to monitor the patient, a delay in diagnosis, incorrect assessment of 
risk, deviation from an agreed protocol without clinical justification, and wrong treatment 
given. Vincent indicates that these care management problems have two essential 
features: factors outside the boundary of safe practice and adverse patient outcomes 
(2003). The identification of these factors is an acknowledgment that individual 
contributions to error do matter and should be considered in error-resolution strategies. It 
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is interesting to note the similarities found in Vincent’s classification and the TERCAP, 
developed by Benner in conjunction with the NCSBN (Benner et al., 2002). Although the 
TERCAP is specific to nursing, both classification systems highlight the individual 
professional’s contribution to error, such as a lack of patient assessment, monitoring, and 
assurance of compliance with orders or protocols. 
Unprofessional Behavior 
In addition to meeting professional standards, health care professionals have a 
duty to avoid engaging in unprofessional behavior. Unprofessional behavior in health 
care providers is an area of concern for licensing boards whose mission is to protect the 
public. Unprofessional conduct may involve substance abuse, sexual misconduct, 
negligence, or any behavior that reflects incompetent, unethical, or illegal activity in 
licensed health care professionals, all of which may injure or harm patients (BNE, 2006). 
Because boards of nursing are a rich source of data on nursing errors, the NCSBN 
compiles descriptive information about nurses who have been disciplined by state boards 
of nursing. This descriptive data provides information to stakeholders such as legislative 
bodies about areas of nursing practice breakdown and responses from boards of nursing. 
For instance, the length of time it takes a board of nursing to complete an investigation is 
of concern because of the need for timely remediation to ensure safe practice. In a survey 
of 19 boards of nursing, the NCSBN found that a total of 17,041 investigations were 
conducted in fiscal year 2002, with 11,991 (70%) completed in the same year. The 
majority of these cases (26%) were related to unprofessional conduct, with substance 
abuse (23%) being the second-leading cause for discipline (NCSBN, 2004). 
The NCSBN is challenged by a myriad of different legal, administrative, and 
methodological issues in its efforts to collect data from all of the state boards of nursing. 
To facilitate a standardized methodology to categorize errors and evaluate outcomes, the 
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NCSBN has been developing the TERCAP as an instrument to compile data from state 
boards of nursing concerning nursing error and its relationship to patient harm. 
There is research about the relationship between unprofessional conduct in 
medical school and subsequent disciplinary action by a licensing board. Papadakis and 
colleagues (Papadakis, Hodgson, Teherani, & Kohastsu, 2004; Papadakis, Teherani, 
Banach, Knettler, Rattner, & Stern, 2005) conducted studies of medical students to 
ascertain factors that contribute to subsequent disciplinary action. In the first exploratory 
study (Papadakis et al., 2004), the researchers reviewed all the graduates from a West 
Coast university who had been disciplined by the state board during the period from 1990 
to 2000. Graduates who had been disciplined (N = 68) were identified and matched by 
graduation year and specialty with controlled graduates (N = 196) who did not have 
board discipline. Results indicated that there was a small but significant difference in 
undergraduate grade point average (3.3 GPA disciplined, 3.4 GPA non-disciplined, p = 
0.04). The study also found that students in medical school who received written 
comments regarding unprofessional behavior were twice as likely to be disciplined by a 
board of medicine for a violation related to unprofessional conduct (odds ratio, 2.15, p = 
0.02). Papadakis et al. (2005) replicated this study by examining graduates (N = 235) 
from three medical schools who were disciplined by any of 40 state boards of medicine. 
As in the previous study, there were undisciplined physicians (N = 469) who were 
matched according to medical school and graduation year. Again, there was a small but 
significant difference in grade point average between the disciplined and undisciplined 
groups (GPA 3.3 disciplined, GPA 3.5 undisciplined, p = 0.002). In addition, there was a 
significant difference in the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) scores (0.6 
disciplined, 0.8 disciplined, p < 0.001). Prior unprofessional conduct in medical school 
was strongly associated with later disciplinary action by a board (odds ratio, 3.0, p < 
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0.001). Two types of unprofessional behavior independently predicted disciplinary 
action: irresponsibility (odds ratio, 8.5, 95% confidence interval, 1.8 to 40.1) and 
diminished capacity for self-improvement (odds ratio, 3.1, 95% confidence interval, 1.2 
to 8.2). The 2005 Papadakis et al. study supports the findings of the author’s earlier 
research and may be useful for evaluating unprofessional conduct in the general 
population of medical students. The researchers state that the study provides support for 
specific actions to be taken by medical schools, including the inclusion of 
professionalism as a competency, graduation objectives that contain explicit language 
about professional behavior, and standardized instruments that assess personal qualities 
of medical school applicants and can predict early medical school performance 
(Papadakis et al., 2005). 
In summary, studies pertaining to the characteristics of health care practitioners 
support their involvement in medical errors. Human Factors Theory provides an approach 
to understanding human error (IOM, 2000; Reason, 1990). The effects of fatigue in 
medical error are becoming more prominent in the literature, and studies reflect that 
health care workers do report errors while fatigued and often are not aware of their own 
limitations from stress and fatigue when providing care to patients (Jagsi et al., 2005; 
Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000). Addressing health care worker competency to 
improve patient safety has been prioritized by the CAC; however, studies to support 
competency as a contributing factor in error commission are not conclusive (Hicks, 
Santell, et al., 2004; Bulla, 2003). Unprofessional behavior in health care practitioners is 
of concern to boards of nursing in regards to patient safety. Two studies indicate that 
students who are disciplined for unprofessional behaviors in medical school as more 
likely to be disciplined by a board of medicine once licensed (Papadakis et al., 2004; 
Papadakis et al., 2005). 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF HEALTH CARE TEAMS THAT MAY POSE THREATS TO 
PATIENT SAFETY 
The majority of research found in the patient safety literature concerns 
communication within teams as a threat to patient safety and a factor in medical error. 
This section will review the research related to communication within teams in the 
aviation industry and the health care industry. This approach is pertinent given earlier 
discussions on the aviation industry’s contribution to research on safety. 
Sexton, Thomas, and Helmreich (2000), in a study of 1,033 doctors, nurses, and 
residents, found that communication and teamwork not only served to manage errors; 
they also increased efficiency, morale, and satisfaction with employment. Vital Smarts 
(2005) reports that poor teamwork in the health care industry is a widespread problem 
and a factor that impedes patient safety. JCAHO statistics from 1995 to 2004 on root 
causes of sentinel events such as patient death and serious patient harm reflect that factors 
in communication are involved in almost 70% of sentinel events (JCAHO, 2005). 
Helmreich (2000a) has conducted observational studies of team communication in both 
the aviation and the health care industries. Error conditions observed in airplane cockpits 
included procedural and communication deficiencies that highlighted the need for team 
training (Helmreich, 2000a). Similar behaviors were also observed in teams in the OR 
setting, including communication issues such as failure to inform a team member of the 
patient’s problem, leadership issues such as failure to determine who was the leader in 
the OR, and interpersonal conflict such as overt hostility to team members (Helmreich, 
2000a). 
There have been a number of studies conducted in the OR concerning health care 
team interaction and communication. This may be due to anesthesia’s early role in human 
factors science (Pierce, 2001) and the fact that surgical settings and procedures are 
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conducive to observing the entire health care team in one place at one time. In an 
observational study of teamwork communication (Lingard, Espin, Whyte, Regehr, Baker, 
& Resnick, 2004), trained observers reviewed 48 surgical procedures involving 94 team 
members, including physicians and nurses using a framework of content, audience, 
purpose, and occasion of a communication exchange. Communication failure was defined 
as an event in one or more of the factors in the framework. Results of the study indicated 
that 30% of the communication events were failures. Of the failures, 36% resulted in 
inefficiency, tension, waste of resources, delay, inconvenience for the patient, or 
procedural error (Lingard et al., 2004). As a response to this study, the researcher 
conducted another study to ascertain the feasibility (willingness to use and ability to 
incorporate into work processes) of a checklist for the OR team to ensure a review of 
critical factors related to the surgical procedure (Lingard, Espin, Whyte, Colmenares, 
Baker, & Doran, 2005). Trained observers used ethnographic field notes and brief 
feedback interviews. Eighteen teams and their corresponding surgical procedures were 
reviewed. The rate of the OR team members using the checklist was 100%. Review of the 
checklist by the OR team took 1 to 6 minutes (mean 3.5 minutes), and most of the 
reviews took place before the patient’s arrival. The OR team members’ perceived 
function of the checklist included documentation of detailed case-related information, 
confirmation of details of the case, verbalization of concerns or ambiguities, and team 
building. The most frequent barrier identified in the study was bringing the team 
members together to review the checklist due to the variability of each member’s 
preoperative responsibilities for the case. The researchers concluded that the checklist 
showed promise in promoting an exchange of information and team building, though 
further testing was needed to determine the impact on patient safety (Lingard et al., 
2005). 
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An intervention study of medical team training as the treatment was conducted to 
determine the effect of the training on communication among the members of the health 
care team in the OR (Awad, Fagan, Bellows, Albo, Green-Rashad, & De la Garza, 2005). 
The training consisted of didactic instruction, interactive participation, role-play, and 
clinical vignettes. A change team contributed to the study by reinforcing principles of the 
training through a preoperative briefing with the team. The researchers conducted a 
pretest and a posttest analysis (instrument reported as “validated”) to ascertain the 
perspectives of OR staff (physicians, anesthesiologists, and nurses; N not reported) on the 
improvement of communication within the team after the training. Pre- and posttests of 
the team produced mixed results. Surgeons (p < 0.0004) and anesthesiologists (p < 
0.0008) showed significant increases in their perception of team communication after 
team training. The nurses, however, did not indicate any improvement in communication 
after the training (p = 0.7). The researchers surmised that this was due to the small 
number of nurses (N not reported) in the study, and they suggested that future studies that 
included training for all of the surgical nurses would improve nursing scores (Awad et al., 
2005). However, it is interesting to note that in a study conducted by Sexton et al. (2000) 
of OR and ICU staff, 77% of doctors rated teamwork within their group at a high level 
while only 40% of nurses who worked with them did so. Although anecdotal, these 
differences might suggest varying ideas about what constitutes effective teamwork based 
on discipline or perhaps even gender. 
Thomas, Sexton, and Helmreich (2004) conducted focus groups of physicians and 
nurses (N = 36) to ascertain their perceptions about working together in an ICU. Using 
qualitative data analysis, the researchers identified three main themes that affected each 
participant’s ability to work with other members of the team. The first theme was 
provider characteristics such as personal attributes, reputation, and expertise. The second 
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theme related to workplace factors such as staffing, organization of work, and the 
working environment. The third theme related to group influences such as how the group 
communicated and relationships among the providers. The researchers concluded that the 
results of the study could promote the development of what they call behavioral markers 
to counter the effect of threats and errors in the environment. Behavioral marker is a term 
that describes evidence-based behaviors that have been shown to manage threats and 
errors in aviation and the health care arena (Thomas et al., 2004). 
Communication of critical lab values is necessary to prevent potentially life-
threatening situations for patients. Calling the treatment team over the telephone about 
critical results is the most common method used to communicate this information 
(Barenfanger, Sautter, Lang, As, Collins, & Hacek, 2004). Because of the opportunity to 
misunderstand critical patient lab values, a descriptive study was conducted to better 
understand the process. Three health care organizations, borrowing a methodology from 
the aviation industry that requires pilots to repeat directions from air traffic controllers, 
investigated whether this process would work for their organizations by using a process 
of repeating back the message of critical lab values when received. Participants included 
physicians, nurses, and other health care personnel who received calls from the 
laboratory. Of 822 calls from the laboratory, 29 (3.5%) involved errors. Calls made to 
physicians had the highest rate of error (physicians = 5.0%, nurses = 3.4%, other 
personnel = 3.5%). The average time to repeat the information was 12.8 seconds, and 
costs were determined to be approximately $0.11 to $0.16 per call. As a result of this 
research, JCAHO now requires the use of this method to improve communication and 
reduce errors (JCAHO, 2006; Barenfanger et al., 2004). 
Lack of teamwork can also pose a threat to correctly identifying patients. In a root 
cause analysis and case study of a patient who was mistakenly taken for another patient’s 
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electrophysiology procedure, it was found that both physicians and nurses failed to 
communicate with one another and did not listen to the patient. In addition, the analysis 
showed that team members were unsure of their roles and did not know the proper 
protocol for patient identification and transport. The researchers concluded that because 
of poor communication patterns, staff expected faulty and incomplete exchanges of 
information (Chassin & Becker, 2002). 
Communication during “handoffs” is an area that needs research and study. 
Handoffs are defined as “the transfer of the role and responsibility for patient care from 
one person to another in a physical or mental process” (Solet, Norvell, Ruten, & Frankel, 
2005, p. 1094). This study by Solet and colleagues included a review of the literature and 
an evaluation of four hospitals. Solet and colleagues identified several barriers to 
effective, safe patient handoffs. Of particular importance were language barriers between 
providers and non-English speaking patients. The researchers stated that strategies to 
improve handoffs include precise, unambiguous, face-to-face communication with 
standardized processes and educational methods to ensure an understanding of safe, 
satisfying, and effective methods (Solet et al., 2005).  
Issues with the collective behavior of health care teams and its impact on patient 
safety were studied by Vital Smarts in partnership with the American Association of 
Critical Care Nurses (Vital Smarts, 2005). In a survey (no report of reliability and 
validity) of more than 1,700 health care personnel—including 1,143 nurses, 106 
physicians, 266 clinical staff, and 175 administrators—participants were questioned 
about factors that contributed to a lack of quality care as well as employee satisfaction. 
Several factors emerged from the study that reflect barriers or threats to patient safety. 
These threats include the following: 
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1. Broken Rules – 84% of physicians and 62% of nurses and other clinical care 
providers have observed some of their team members (about 10%) take shortcuts 
that could be dangerous to patients. 
2. Mistakes – 88% of physicians and 48% of nurses and other clinical care providers 
have observed some of their team members (about 10%) show poor clinical 
judgment. 
3. Lack of Support – 53% of nurses and other clinical care providers report that 10% 
or more of their colleagues are reluctant to assist them, are impatient, or refuse to 
answer their questions. 
4. Poor Teamwork – 88% of nurses and other clinical care providers have one or 
more teammates who undermine the team by exhibiting behaviors such as not 
doing their fair share or making themselves look good at the expense of others. 
5. Disrespect – 77% of nurses or other clinical care providers work with some 
colleagues who are condescending or rude, and 33% work with some who are 
verbally abusive. 
The respondents were also asked if they had approached their colleagues about 
the observed behaviors. Less than 1 in 10 had discussed their concerns with the 
coworkers. Lack of ability, a belief that it is “not their job,” and a lack of confidence that 
it would do any good were the most frequent reasons the respondents did not discuss their 
concerns with colleagues. Other obstacles included lack of time and fear of retaliation. 
The findings of the 10% who responded that they did speak up about factors that 
compromised patient care had statistically significant (p < 0.001) correlations with self 
reports of better patient outcomes, working beyond the minimum required, higher morale, 
and more satisfaction with their work (Vital Smarts, 2005). 
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In summary, the importance of communication within the health care team is 
reflected in several studies regarding medical error. Communication failure (Lingard et 
al., 2004), how groups communicate (Thomas et al., 2004), uncertainty of roles (Chassin 
& Becker, 2002), and a feeling by providers that it is “not their job” to approach 
colleagues who made errors (Vital Smarts, 2005) are among the threats to patient safety 
found within health care teams. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF PATIENTS THAT MAY POSE THREATS TO PATIENT SAFETY 
Patient characteristics that contribute to error commission and threats to safety 
also merit review and analysis. The literature is beginning to show that patient 
characteristics do contribute to errors. These characteristics include the patient’s 
accountability (or lack thereof) for their own health care, having the ability to identify 
threats and errors, physical characteristics, types of treatment, and communication 
barriers. 
Accountability 
A survey (no report of instrument reliability and validity) of 2,388 physicians, 
pharmacists, and nurses was conducted to ascertain their perceptions of barriers to patient 
safety and strategies to improve it (Iowa Department of Public Health, 2000). Both 
physicians (63%) and pharmacists (61%) reported that a lack of accountability by patients 
for the management of their health was a barrier to safe practice. Nurses did not identify 
patient-specific characteristics in their top four barriers, though they did identify staffing 
and funding issues. Although there was no consensus on which of the barriers had the 
most impact, the majority of the survey participants concurred that educating patients 
about their role in the health care system and establishing continuity of care across 
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settings are important activities to improve patient safety (Iowa Department of Public 
Health, 2000). 
Identifying Errors 
Can patients identify errors or injuries during their care? A study of hospitalized 
patients suggests that they can (Weingart, Pagovich, Sands, Li, Aronson, & Davis, 2005). 
The researchers conducted a prospective cohort study of 228 adults in a medicine unit in 
a teaching hospital. Investigators reviewed incident reports and medical records in 
conjunction with interviews of patients during their hospitalization and by telephone 10 
days after discharge. The purpose of the interview was to ascertain the patients’ 
perspectives of “problems, mistakes, and injuries” that occurred during hospitalization. 
Patients reported adverse events from errors in nearly 9 of 100 admissions. Serious 
injuries were not common, though two thirds of the patients reported that errors were 
preventable. The researchers reviewed the patients’ medical records and hospital incident 
reports and found that only 40% of adverse events, medical errors, and near misses were 
documented. In addition to surveying patients, the researchers calculated event rates and 
utilized multivariable regression models to investigate factors associated with patient-
reported events. Patients who were on more medications were more likely to report 
adverse events (incidence rate ratio [IRR] 1:1 for each additional medication). In 
addition, patients with three or more drug allergies were more likely to report errors (IRR 
4:7). This study by Weingart et al. (2005) suggests that patients are able to identify errors 
and injuries during their care that may not be identified by normal reporting mechanisms. 
Additionally, those patients on multiple medications or with multiple drug allergies may 
be more likely to experience an adverse event. 
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Patient Characteristics 
Patient-related errors were investigated in a descriptive study of patients who had 
foreign bodies left behind from surgical operations (Gawande, Studdert, Orav, Brennan, 
& Zinner, 2003). The researchers conducted a secondary analysis of data from medical 
records or claims from a large malpractice insurer’s database related to this type of error. 
They identified 54 cases with records of a retained foreign object. For a control group (N 
not reported), they randomly selected cases that had the same type of surgery without 
incident. The researchers found that patients with retained foreign bodies were 
significantly more likely (p > 0.001) than the controls to have had emergency surgery or 
an unexpected change in the surgical procedure (p > 0.001). Patients with a higher mean 
body-mass index were also less likely to have had counts of sponges and instruments. A 
multivariate analysis showed that factors associated with an increased risk for surgically 
retained foreign bodies included emergency surgery (p < 0,001), unplanned changes in 
the operation (p = 0.01), and higher body-mass index (p = 0.01). The researchers also 
found a 1:1 risk ratio for each one-unit increment in the body-mass index. 
Communication 
As noted earlier in the literature review, communication between health care 
providers is an important factor in error commission. Additionally, communication 
between the patients and health care providers is equally important. The issue of language 
barriers and their association with errors was investigated in families with hospitalized 
pediatric patients (Cohen, Rivara, Marcuse, McPhillips, & Davis, 2005). In a 
nonexperimental, case-controlled study, 97 pediatric patients who had a reported serious 
medical error in a large academic regional hospital over a five-year period were 
compared with 475 control patients who did not have a serious medical error. The case 
patients were matched on the factors of age, admitting service, admission to intensive 
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care, and date of admission with the control patients. The researchers found that the 
largest subgroup of the case group included Spanish-speaking patients and families who 
had a two-fold increased risk of having a serious medical error (odds ratio, 2.26, 95% 
confidence interval). The results suggest that patient safety initiatives in hospital settings 
may need strategies that address language barriers. 
An investigation of the importance of communication between health care 
providers and patients with abnormal mammograms was conducted by Poon, Hass, 
Puopolo, Gandhi, Burdick, and Bates (2004). The researchers implemented a prospective 
longitudinal study utilizing medical records and patient surveys in 10 ambulatory care 
centers. To determine the proportion of women who received appropriate follow-up care, 
126 cases of women who had abnormal mammograms were analyzed. Of the 126 women 
in the study, 81 (64%) received appropriate follow-up care. After risk adjustment for age 
and insurance status, two communication factors were found to be independently 
associated with appropriate follow up. The most significant factor was the patients’ 
understanding of the need for the follow up (p = 0.006). Secondly, the researchers found 
that the physicians’ documentation of a follow-up plan in the medical record was also 
significant (p = 0.029). None of the patients’ physical or psychological factors were 
associated with appropriate follow-up care (Poon et al., 2004). 
In summary, studies regarding patients’ contribution to error reflect that patients 
are able to identify injuries and errors during their care and should be educated and held 
accountable for their role regarding patient safety (Weingart et al., 2005; Iowa 
Department of Public Health, 2000). Certain treatments and patient conditions, including 
language barriers, may precipitate medical errors, and health care settings should develop 
strategies to monitor and address these factors (Weingart et al., 2005; Gawande et al., 
2003; Poon et al., 2004). 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS THAT MAY POSE THREATS TO 
PATIENT SAFETY 
What constitutes organizational/system threats in medical error? Though the 
TEMM outlines “Organizational Culture” as a latent threat and “Organizational Factors” 
as an overt threat, the literature reflects the grouping of both of these concepts into one 
broad concept called “Systems Issues or System Factors.” Because the research supports 
this approach, the following review of the literature will address latent and overt threats 
under the rubric of health care systems threats. Topics in this review include staffing and 
its relationship to patient outcomes, cultural aspects that influence the reporting of errors, 
and the effect of information technology on threats to patient safety. To facilitate an 
understanding of the magnitude of patient safety and systems research, a brief theoretical 
discussion will provide the context for the research that has been conducted in this area. 
In addition, research about the patients’ perspectives on system threats to quality health 
care supports a holistic review of the issue. 
Health care organizations are complex systems and as such have many 
interdependent parts. The number of parts, combined with the interdependency of the 
parts, determines an organization’s complexity (Scott, 2004). Asymmetry in the 
information exchange within a system contributes to an organization’s complexity and 
requires an understanding of non-linear methodologies in managing health care 
organizations (McDaniel & Driebe, 2001; Thomas, & Houston, 2005). Gaps form in 
complex systems between people and processes, which leads to an inconsistency between 
the beginning and the end of care processes (Hemman, 2002). 
What are some of the components of failure in complex systems that contribute to 
error? In a study involving a review of the literature and telephone interviews of leaders 
in the patient safety research and policy arena, Walshe and Shortell (2004) found several 
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common themes that appear to contribute to instances of major failures. These include 
repeated, well-known (but not addressed), long-standing problems; lack of management 
or review of incident reporting and performance; and barriers to disclosure and 
investigation. In addition to a complex health care organization, the analysis of nursing 
care’s effect on patient outcomes is also complex. Bowker and Starr (2000) discuss the 
invisible nature of nurses’ work, claiming that nurses’ tasks are so numerous and 
pervasive that defining the continuum of duties needed to care for patients is complex and 
difficult. Yet it is these phenomena that may very well contribute to, or impede, patient 
safety. Investigating the latent (or hidden) contributions to errors as well as the more 
visible overt contributions acknowledges the multidimensional contributions of a 
complex environment found within most health care organizations and supports a more 
sustained error management plan. 
Staffing 
Vincent (2003) claims that there are factors in the work environment, such as 
staffing ratios, that can produce error-causing conditions. Blegan, Goode, and Reed 
(1998), using data from hospital records, investigated the relationships among incidence 
rates of six commonly reported adverse patient outcomes and the proportion of hours of 
care given by RNs. The researchers controlled for the acuity of the patients on the unit 
through a risk-adjustment methodology. Using a multivariate analysis, the researchers 
found that the proportion of hours of care delivered by RNs was inversely related to 
medication errors (–0.530), decubiti (–0.485), and patient complaints (–0.312). An 
unexpected finding was that proportion of care that was delivered by RNs was 
curvilinear. As the RN proportion of nurse staffing increased to 87.5%, the rate of 
adverse outcomes decreased. However, if the RN staffing went above 87.5%, the level of 
adverse patient outcome rates increased. The researchers surmised that this unexpected 
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finding was related to patient acuity and, although they controlled for patient acuity, these 
controls may not have been sensitive enough for the study (Blegan et al., 1998). 
In an exploratory study, patient outcomes and nurse staffing were examined by 
utilizing secondary data from 168 hospitals in Pennsylvania, the American Hospital 
Association, and the Pennsylvania Department of Health Hospital Survey (Aiken et al., 
2002). The researchers’ objective was to investigate whether risk-adjusted surgical 
mortality rates and deaths from serious complications were lower in hospitals where the 
RN-to-patient ratios were lower. The researchers utilized a risk-adjustment process to 
control for patient and hospital characteristics. Using logistic regression models, they 
found that the odds of patient mortality increased by 7% for every additional patient in a 
nurse’s assignment. The researchers suggested that if RNs were assigned four patients 
instead of eight, an estimated 1,000 patients might receive a nursing intervention that 
would save their lives (Aiken et al., 2002). 
Potter, Barr, McSweeney, and Sledge (2003) also investigated nurse staffing and 
patient outcomes. Using a prospective, correlational design, the researchers measured 
several nurse-sensitive outcomes in patients, including patients’ perceived health status, 
pain, and self-care ability, to ascertain whether these outcomes were affected by staffing 
variables. The study was unique in that it included self-reported patient data regarding 
symptom management and self-care status for the purpose of developing a baseline to 
track patient outcomes. The percentage of RN hours was negatively correlated with the 
patients’ perceived pain (–0.31, p < 0.05) and self-care ability (–0.33, p < 0.05) and 
positively correlated with the patients’ perceived health status (0.31, p < 0.05). These 
findings suggest that the higher the percentage of nursing care by RNs, the lower the 
perception of pain and self-care needs and the higher the patients’ evaluation of their 
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health status. The researchers concluded that the study supported the predictive value of 
nurse staffing (Potter et al., 2003). 
Culture of Safety 
The importance of effective reporting systems to create and sustain cultures that 
promote patient safety has been emphasized by the IOM (2000, 2004). Research in this 
area substantiates this emphasis. In a qualitative study using a structured interview 
process, 22 health care professionals (12 patient safety officers and 10 nurses) and 15 
patients from a sample of acute care hospitals (N not reported) in Pennsylvania were 
queried about their perceptions of breakdowns in error-reporting systems (Atkins, 2004). 
Nine themes emerged related to the reduction and recurrence of medical error. These 
themes included low reporting due to a blaming culture, lack of standardization of error-
reporting systems, failure to complete error-reporting forms, corrective actions that are 
not effective, a disconnect between frontline workers and administration, and not 
incorporating all hospital personnel into the error-reporting system. Based on the findings 
and conclusions of the study, the researcher offered recommendations for each major 
breakdown in the error-reporting system (Atkins, 2004). 
In a descriptive study of reporting systems in non-medical systems, researchers 
found several barriers and incentives in the organizational culture that impeded the error-
reporting process (Barach & Small, 2000). Using a literature search and semi-structured 
interviews with directors of reporting systems and experts in the field (N not reported), 
the researchers identified individual, organizational, and societal barriers and incentives 
to reporting errors. For instance, individuals may fear reprisal and have a lack of trust 
about reporting, which can be mitigated by reporting systems that provide confidentiality 
and immunity. At the organizational level, fear of litigation, costs, and bad publicity 
decreased reporting but were mitigated by reporting systems that provide immunity and 
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trustworthiness. Likewise, legal barriers in societies include impediments to peer review 
and a lack of communication between multi-institutional databases. Mitigating activities 
to these barriers include the assurance of accountability and enforcement of reporting 
statutes. Societal actions that can mitigate barriers to reporting include the assurance of 
accountability and enforcement of reporting statutes. The researchers concluded that 
reporting systems are effective in non-medical, high-risk industries because they benefit 
the organization more than they cost. The researchers propose that similar benefits may 
have promise in the health care industry if established into an organization’s culture. 
In an intervention study, the effects of “executive walk rounds” (EWR) on nurses’ 
attitudes toward the safety climate were evaluated using a pretest and posttest evaluation 
(Thomas, Sexton, Neilands, Frankel, & Helmreich, 2005). To test the model in health 
care, the researchers formed an EWR group that was composed of two executive vice 
presidents and four assistant vice presidents, hypothesizing that EWRs would improve 
the safety climate on the clinical units. The researchers randomly assigned 23 units to the 
study. Eleven units were assigned to the intervention group, and 12 units were assigned to 
the control group. A sample of 260 nurses (RNs, Licensed Vocational Nurses [LVNs], 
and nurse managers) and other health care personnel (N not reported) who worked on the 
intervention units were visited by the EWR team. There were 338 nurses (RNs, LVNs, 
and nurse managers) and other health care personnel (N not reported) who worked on the 
control units and did not receive an EWR visit. The baseline Safety Climate Survey 
(reliability and validity not reported) was administered to all of the participants between 
September 1 and October 15, 2002. The EWR occurred between October 31, 2002, and 
January 31, 2003. The Safety Climate Survey was re-administered in March and April 
2003. The researchers reported only the results relating to nursing personnel. Results 
indicate that the baseline mean safety scores before the EWR intervention were similar 
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between the two groups (78.97 control, 76.78 intervention, p = 0.458). There was no 
significant difference between the control group and the intervention group (77.93 
control, 78.33 intervention, p = 0.854) after the EWR. However, there was a significant 
difference in the scores on the Safety Climate Survey between nurses in the intervention 
group who had actually been on the unit during the EWR and nurses who were on the 
control unit and did not experience the EWR (74.88 control, 81.01 intervention, p = 
0.02). The researchers noted that not all nurses in the intervention group were exposed to 
the EWR, resulting in a limitation to the study, but concluded that the results indicated a 
positive effect of the EWR on safety attitudes of nurses who were present for the 
intervention. 
Information Technology 
The literature also supports the investigation of technological supports for patient 
safety initiatives. The importance of information technology as a component of patient 
safety has been demonstrated in a survey implemented by the Healthcare Information and 
Management Systems Society (HIMSS, 2003). In the spring of 2003, HIMSS conducted 
a Web-based survey of 247 senior-level executives, department heads, and managers 
from health care provider organizations. More than 90% of the respondents worked in 
hospital settings. Findings indicated that nearly all of the survey respondents (99%) 
believed that technology can address at least one patient safety issue. Of these issues, 
medication errors (93%), excessive time on administrative tasks (54%), quality of care 
(42%), and variability of care (40%) were the most frequently cited. When asked what 
technologies would improve patient care, bar codes for medication administration was 
most frequently cited (80%), followed by computerized provider order entry (76%). 
However, only 19% of the organizations had implemented bar codes for medication 
administration and 21% had implemented computerized provider order entry systems. 
 52
Other technologies that had better implementation rates include reporting systems for 
patient safety (53%), Web access to patient information (55%), and automated 
medication cabinets (55%). On a self-assessment of their organizations’ preparation for 
patient safety, the average response was 4.38 (1 = not at all prepared, 7 = completely 
prepared). The researchers concluded that responses indicate that technology is important 
and that hospitals are becoming committed to utilizing technology for improving patient 
safety (HIMSS, 2003). 
In contrast to findings in the study by HIMSS that indicate broad support for 
increasing technologies in health care to address patient safety, research shows that there 
are some unintended consequences of technology. Using a qualitative design, Ash, Berc, 
and Coiera (2003) reviewed the literature and numerous qualitative studies and found two 
categories of error that occur at the interface of humans and patient care information 
systems: errors in the process of entering and retrieving information and errors from 
information systems that affect the communication and coordination of events and 
activities. In the first category of error, the researchers found that busy health care 
environments, with frequent interruptions, are not conducive to computer data entry. 
Another problem is the technical expertise needed to select the correct patient care 
treatment. For instance, one physician claimed that it was too easy to click on the wrong 
treatment option instead of the correct treatment option. Other problems occur when 
orders are entered into the system for the wrong patient. Most health care providers have 
been trained to evaluate patients with free text, and forced data entry into coded or 
structured formats can be time consuming and burdensome. Switching from screen to 
screen to access patient information also impeded health care providers’ ability to acquire 
and maintain an overview of the case (Ash et al., 2003). 
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In the second category of error, Ash et al. (2003) found factors that influenced the 
communication and coordination of information systems that may impede safe care. 
Information systems are structured on a chain of predictable, ordered events, but health 
care processes are very fluid and flexible. For example, one nurse could not give an 
urgent medication to a patient because the physician had not entered the order on the 
computer. In another example, a drug had been ordered three times a day but one dose 
had already been given, so the system would not allow the nurse to chart the medication 
because the system considered it an incomplete task. Other issues with coordination 
include “workarounds,” which allow users to circumvent some of the demands of the 
system. These shortcuts may lead to patient safety issues such as multiple or repetitive 
orders. 
In addition to identifying issues with information technology in the review of the 
literature and qualitative studies, the researchers also found ways to address these 
problems. Educating health care providers, ensuring that vendors clarify limitations in 
their information systems, and continuing to research the problem were some of the 
suggestions (Ash et al., 2003). 
Patient Perspectives 
What about the patient’s viewpoint on contributions to error? In a descriptive 
study that solicited patients’ perspectives on quality care and medical error, 21 patients 
from three clinics were interviewed and asked to “tell their stories” in focus groups 
(Dowell, Manwell, Maguire, An, Paluch, & Felix, 2005). 
The researchers used a qualitative study with a standardized questionnaire to 
capture the respondents’ input. All but 2% of 187 distinct comments could be grouped 
into four categories: system issues, interpersonal skills, knowledge/technical skills, and 
errors. The results indicated that the majority of the comments (44%) related to system 
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issues such as a lack of access, long waits, understaffing, and underfunding. Interpersonal 
skills (37%), knowledge and technical skills (9%), and errors (7%) were also 
acknowledged. This study indicates that patients are concerned about system 
contributions to quality and error (Dowell et al., 2005). 
In summary, studies regarding system contributions to error events reflect that 
staffing methodologies do affect patient morbidity and mortality (Blegan et al., 1998; 
Aiken et al., 2002; Potter et al., 2003). Organizational cultures that blame, do not promote 
trust, and lack standardization in reporting systems can impose barriers to effective error-
reduction strategies (Atkins, 2004; Barach & Small, 2000), while mitigating or proactive 
measures include creating incentives to report errors, developing reporting systems that 
are trustworthy and reliable, and demonstrating the leadership’s commitment to patient 
safety through executive walk rounds (Barach & Small, 2000; Thomas et al., 2005). The 
role of information technology regarding patient safety, though promising, has limitations 
(HIMSS, 2003; Ash et al., 2003), and patients are concerned about system contributions 
to medical errors (Dowell et al., 2005). 
SUMMARY 
The literature reflects emerging evidence to support the relational nature of 
individual, team, patient, and system factors that contribute to threats to patient safety. 
All of the studies found in the literature were descriptive and exploratory in nature except 
for two intervention studies that evaluated the effect of an educational program and a 
leadership outreach effort to enhance an organization’s safety culture. The prevalence of 
exploratory and descriptive studies reflects the preliminary state of the science of patient 
safety and medical error and supports the descriptive design of the research study. 
Researchers are still trying to identify and name the phenomena as evidenced by the 
prominence of taxonomies and classification systems in the literature. The lack of 
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reporting of the reliability and validity of research instruments is concerning, particularly 
because these studies were accessed from AHRQ, CINAHL, and Medline. 
A review of the error classification systems indicates that there are emerging 
scientific methods to collect and analyze information about errors. The missing link in the 
literature concerning these systems is a discussion of the compelling reasons 
organizations will use them. Although the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 
2005 encourages error reporting, it does not mandate such. Some states do require error 
reporting, and state-by-state endorsement may be the means to require organizations to 
report errors (Rosenthal & Booth, 2004). However, this raises questions about the ability 
to interface and compare findings among different reporting systems. What is apparent is 
that a common, broad-based repository such as the PSET or AIMS is in order. However, 
this does not negate the need for specialized reporting systems such as the TERCAP or 
MEDMARX systems. 
The PSET is being promoted by the NQF to serve as the common repository for 
disparate reporting systems. This endorsement is interesting in light of political factors as 
well as the scientific merits that must be considered in the selection of a reporting system 
that will serve as the common repository. For instance, how would the PSET interface 
with the patient safety organizations identified in the Patient Safety and Quality 
Improvement Act of 2005? Would the PSET be accepted and endorsed by other 
organizations to serve as a national repository for the reporting and analysis of errors? 
Gaining the NQF’s endorsement may be the first step in developing the political agenda 
needed to endorse the PSET. 
To date, the TERCAP is the only classification system found in the literature that 
was specifically designed to analyze nursing errors. However, the literature makes it clear 
that collecting information about nursing errors through taxonomies and classification 
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systems should not be done in a vacuum. The profession should look to colleagues within 
the health care organizational research arena and collaboratively translate the concept of 
nursing error into measurable phenomena. This collaboration should provide special 
disciplinary considerations within an overarching framework for understanding, 
classifying, and eventually managing errors to promote safe and best practices for all 
health care professionals. 
In reviewing the individual health care practitioner characteristics that contribute 
to threats to safety, the literature provides strong evidence that human behavior is 
complex and that, in order to understand individual contributions to error, the etiology of 
why humans make errors is important. Although most health care professionals will not 
have the depth of knowledge of a cognitive psychologist, an introduction to the discreet 
phenomena in human performance behaviors can contribute to a better understanding of 
the “why” in error commission. Additionally, a better understanding of human factors 
science in researching error commission in health care will promote a more objective 
view of the individual practitioner’s contribution to error. It is well documented that 
health care cultures often “shame and blame” individuals who make mistakes (IOM, 
2000, 2004), and human factors science may contribute to methodologies that anticipate 
and mediate human fallibility. 
The review of the literature indicates that research is needed to better understand 
how unprofessional conduct by health care providers affects patient safety. This need has 
prompted the NCSBN to develop and operate the TERCAP as a classification system for 
all boards of nursing. State boards are rich sources of data about nursing errors, and the 
development of a classification system that identifies the breakdown of practice standards 
involved in nursing errors will provide an analysis and a better understanding of how the 
profession can educate, regulate, and monitor its licensees. 
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The literature concerning characteristics of health care teams that create threats to 
patient safety unequivocally reflects issues concerning the lack of effective and 
comprehensive communication amongst the teams. This emphasis is found in both 
aviation and health care research. The issue is complex, and causal relationships may be 
difficult to ascertain. As researchers in health care have looked to aviation for new 
knowledge and understanding about safety, perhaps they should also reach out to 
professionals that specialize in information, communication, and social sciences. 
Further research in patient characteristics that pose threats to safety could 
contribute to a better understanding of a patient’s clinical condition and its relationship to 
error. Strong relationships between clinical conditions and error may lead to the 
development of error-management strategies and provide a template of high-alert factors 
to be assessed, identified, and managed. A better understanding of methods to address 
safety issues posed by language barriers with patients is particularly important in light of 
the growing cultural diversity of this country. The research also indicates that both 
patients and health care providers believe that patient education is important in promoting 
safety. 
Given that health care organizations are complex systems with multifaceted 
variables and relationships, a review of the literature provides evidence of the use of 
complex research methodologies and data sets to evaluate system components of error. 
For instance, using a methodology called dynamic econometric modeling, McCue, Mark, 
and Harless (2003) examined the relationships among nurse staffing, quality of care, and 
financial performance. The researchers sampled 422 hospitals and utilized data from 
several extensive data sets from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP); the 
American Hospital Association’s annual survey; the Center for Medicaid and Medicare 
Services’ (CMS) minimum cost and capital file, provider of services file, and case mix 
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index file; and the Online Survey Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) system. These 
types of studies may provide methods to begin to explore and understand causal 
relationships. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This exploratory study was conducted using a descriptive survey research design. 
Variables in the study include the following: 
1. Threats – Individual, health care team, patient, and system factors 
2. Errors – A breakdown in medication administration, documentation, 
attentiveness/surveillance, clinical evaluation, prevention, intervention, 
interpretation of doctors’ orders, and patient advocacy 
3. Patient Outcomes – Level of harm  
The modified TERCAP was used to collect information about these variables and 
provided a unique opportunity to analyze descriptive data from nurses who had been 
sanctioned by a board of nursing. This instrument may provide a standardized framework 
for collecting and analyzing information gathered by boards of nursing. In addition to 
studying the descriptive data, correlations between nursing errors and patient outcomes 
were analyzed to explore relationships between types of nursing errors and the level of 
harm to the patient. The study’s nonexperimental methodology is appropriate because of 
the limited empiric knowledge regarding patient safety (Polit & Beck, 2004). 
POPULATION AND SAMPLE 
The study population consisted of RNs in Texas who received a disciplinary order 
from the BNE because of a nursing practice error. As of December 2006, there were 613 
RNs in the BNE database who had received a sanction from the BNE for practice errors 
since December 2004. These nurses received a sanction from the BNE for violations of 
the Nursing Practice Act, Section 301.452 (b)(10)(13), Rule 217.12 (1)(4), which 
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specifies that a person will be disciplined “for failing to care adequately for a patient or to 
conform to the minimum standards of acceptable nursing practice in a manner that, in the 
Board’s opinion, exposes a patient or other person unnecessarily to risk of harm or 
exhibiting unprofessional conduct by engaging in unsafe practice” (Nursing Practice Act, 
2005, no p.). 
The entire population described above composed the sample that was surveyed. 
Using a power analysis for correlational studies with a hypothesized medium effect size, 
power of 0.80 and an alpha of 0.05, a total sample size of 86 was recommended to detect 
a significant correlation assuring a moderate effect size (Elashoff, 2002). Criteria for the 
selection of participants included an RN license in Texas and a sanction ordered by the 
board of nursing for a practice error from December 2004 to December 2006. Exclusion 
criteria that restricted the sample included licensure as an LVN and sanctions of RNs 
concerning substance abuse, mental illness, moral turpitude, or criminal behavior. 
Considering the average response rate of 20% to 30% with mailed surveys, it was 




As noted in Chapter 2, there are several classification systems that categorize 
medical errors. A modified version of the TERCAP classification system was used as the 
survey instrument in this study. This instrument is appropriate for the study not only 
because it was developed for nurses, but also because it captures individual, health care 
team, patient, and system contributions to error. As such, the modified instrument reflects 
major constructs of the TEMM, and using it in this study may promote new knowledge 
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for patient safety theory development. As a taxonomy of nursing error, the TERCAP may 
also prove beneficial for the global repository proposed by the PSET (as discussed in 
Chapter 2) in providing a discipline-specific taxonomy for tracking and monitoring 
nursing errors. 
The TERCAP was specifically developed for classifying nursing errors by 
identifying categories of breakdown in practice within the context of commonly accepted 
nursing practice standards and good practice (Benner et al., 2006). The practice 
breakdown categories were inductively developed by analyzing 21 disciplinary cases 
from nine state boards of nursing (Benner et al., 2002). 
The purpose of the TERCAP is to collect and analyze error data relating to 
discipline cases taken by state boards of nursing. The goal of the TERCAP is to improve 
the effectiveness of nursing regulation through a standardized taxonomy of nursing error 
(Malloch, 2004). Ideally, the aggregation of data from all state boards of nursing will lead 
to new knowledge and contribute to error-prevention strategies. These strategies could be 
embraced by schools of nursing and employers of nurses to help promote safety and 
reduce nursing errors (Benner et al., 2002). 
There are eight major sections in the TERCAP instrument:  
Patient Profile   Health Care Team  
Patient Outcome  Nurse Profile 
Setting    Intentional Misconduct/Criminal Behavior 
Systems Issues  Practice Breakdown 
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The Practice Breakdown section is the taxonomy of eight types of nursing errors: 
Medication Administration  Prevention 
Documentation   Intervention 
Attentiveness/Surveillance  Clinical Reasoning 
 
Interpretation of Authorized  Professional Responsibility/Patient 
Providers’ Orders   Advocacy 
 
The TERCAP is an online database that is housed within the NCSBN. The 
database is available to investigators of all state boards of nursing for the collection and 
analysis of nursing threats and errors. Included in the TERCAP is an inventory of factors 
related to nursing practice breakdown or errors. Board staff can use the inventory to 
select appropriate response options or write in answers for responses marked “Other, 
please specify.” The 60 items in the instrument yield primarily nominal data, except for 
the demographic data section and the patient outcome section, which yields ordinal data. 
Also included is a harm index that ranks the patient outcome from the error, ranging from 
no harm to death. 
Validity of the TERCAP was examined through ongoing and comprehensive 
expert evaluation between 1999 and 2006 (NCSBN, 2006). The development and 
evaluation of the instrument was conducted through the review and analysis from staff of 
state boards of nursing (such as the researcher), board members of state boards of 
nursing, and other nursing practice experts such as Dr. Patricia Benner and Dr. Marie 
Farrell. Because the TERCAP is a categorical instrument that collects primarily nominal 
data, Cohen’s kappa was used to estimate evidence for reliability. The statistical analysis 
resulted in a coefficient of 0.75. Currently, the NSCBN is testing the TERCAP at several 
state boards of nursing across the country. 
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Modified TERCAP 
The TERCAP is a database that can be used to investigate extensive information 
to determine possible disciplinary and remedial action. For the purposes of this study, key 
components of the database were utilized to design a survey to obtain important 
descriptive data and to gain the perspective of the sanctioned nurse regarding contributing 
factors to the error event. Initial modifications were made by the researcher to condense 
the number of items, personalize the language, and eliminate items not pertinent to the 
present study. 
PROCEDURES FOR DATA COLLECTION 
Modifying and Testing the Modified TERCAP 
The first phase of the study required an independent IRB review and approval to 
conduct cognitive interviews to modify the instrument and implement test-retest 
measures to evaluate evidence of reliability. Cognitive interviewing is a process used for 
survey development by studying how targeted groups understand, mentally process, and 
respond to information given to them (Willis, 2005). By questioning the participants 
about each item on the instrument, the researcher is able to evaluate potential problems in 
the instrument (Willis). Willis states that between 5 and 15 participants should be 
interviewed before the findings are reviewed and interpreted. 
Cognitive interviews were conducted with five RNs who currently serve or who 
served in the recent past as direct patient care providers, thus reflecting the demographics 
of the nurses participating in the full study. The researcher mailed the modified 
instrument to the participants and asked them to review it thoroughly. After the RNs 
reviewed the instrument, the researcher conducted interviews to review the instrument, 
documenting the participants’ input and insights about their understanding of each item. 
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A list of questions was developed to explore the participants’ understanding of the 
perceived purpose of the survey instrument, clarity, applicability, and the appropriateness 
of each item. Participants were also questioned about terms that might better describe 
items in the instrument. For example, they were queried about the terms for practice 
errors such as practice breakdown, practice incident, or error event. Most of the 
participants did not like the term practice breakdown because of its negative connotation, 
although it is predominantly used in the TERCAP. In response to the negativity voiced by 
the participants concerning the Practice Breakdown item, which is the taxonomy of error, 
the item was renamed Eight Standards of Practice. The descriptor under the item 
contained an explanation of the standard and a subsequent question asking if there was an 
issue in meeting the standard that contributed to the error event. Originally, the Practice 
Breakdown section was listed as a simple, dichotomous checklist to check yes or no if the 
applicable error was involved. However, during the cognitive interviewing process, the 
respondents were asked whether the dichotomous response should be expanded to 
provide more response alternatives. Feedback from the interviews reflected that 
participants wanted an opportunity to rate the degree to which each error contributed to 
the incident rather than choosing only whether or not a type of error contributed to the 
problem. 
Once the interviews were completed and modifications made to the instrument, its 
reliability was explored using a test-retest method administered to 10 RNs meeting the 
same demographic criteria of the study sample. This approach is used to explore 
reliability in self-rating instruments by evaluating consistency of responses (Streiner & 
Norman, 2004). Time intervals between test and retest ranged from 2 to 14 days (Streiner 
& Norman, 2004). To conduct the test-retest analysis, the RNs were sent two survey 
instruments with a case study and asked to complete the surveys based on the case study. 
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They were asked to complete and return the first survey instrument and then complete the 
second survey instrument one week after sending in the first survey instrument. All 10 
RNs completed the surveys, yielding a statistical review of 20 surveys. The degree of 
test-retest percent agreement between the nominal level items of the RNs’ first and 
second surveys was evaluated (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Degree of Test-Retest Percent Agreement 
Systems Factors Health Care Team Factors Patient Outcome 
Communication – 80%  
Environment – 80% 
Management – 90% 
Backup and support – 80% 
Staffing – 90% 
Communication – 70% 
Lack of Teamwork – 70% 
Inadq. Patient Support – 60% 
Unwritten Unit Norms – 100% 
 
Patient Harm - 90% 
 
Standards Individual Contributions Other System 
Clinical Evaluation – 80% 
Prevention – 50% 
Intervention – 70% 
Interpretation of Authorized 
Providers’ Orders – 50% 
Documentation – 60% 
Patient Advocacy – 90% 
Inexperience – 90% 
Language Barriers – 90% 
Drugs/Alcohol – 100% 
Fatigue – 80% 
Mental Health – 100% 
No Rest/Meal Breaks – 80% 
Language Barriers – 90% 
High Work Volume – 90% 
Conflict Team – 100% 
Overwhelming Assn. – 70% 
 
The majority of the results were within the 60% to 100% range except for the 
items Prevention (50%) and Interpretation of Authorized Providers Orders (50%). Further 
investigation on these two items was done using a Spearman’s rho correlational analysis. 
Using SPSS software, a Spearman’s rho correlational analysis was conducted to evaluate 
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the ordinal data in the items concerning patient harm and the eight standards of practice 
(see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Spearman’s Rho Analysis of Patient Harm and Practice Standards 
Patient Harm – 0.818 
Clinical Evaluation – 0.745 
Prevention – 0.608 
Intervention – 0.713 
Interpretation of Authorized Providers’ 
Orders – 0.184 
Documentation – 0.655 
Patient Advocacy – 0.996 
 
With the exception of one item, Interpretation of Authorized Providers’ Orders, 
which had a 0.184 coefficient, all of the Spearman’s rho analyses ranged from 0.608 to 
0.996. Reasons the item Interpretation of Authorized Providers’ Orders was an outlier 
were evaluated. During the development of the TERCAP, the original item was named 
Interpretation of Doctors’ Orders but was modified to Interpretation of Authorized 
Providers’ Orders to include orders written by advanced practice nurses, physician’s 
assistants, and other health care providers. It was decided that this language may have 
been confusing to the participants, and so Interpretation of Authorized Providers’ Orders 
was renamed with the original term, Interpretation of Doctors’ Orders. Appendix C 
contains the finalized instrument that was used in this study. 
Implementation of the Study 
Once the instrument was modified by cognitive interviews, test-retested for 
evidence of reliability, and approved by the Internal Review Board, the study was 
implemented beginning with the selection of the sample. The BNE Information 
Technology Specialist assisted by obtaining a list of all RNs who had received a sanction 
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for a practice error between December 2004 and December 2006. The information in the 
database used is public as outlined in the Nursing Practice Act, Section 301.466, which 
clarifies that formal charges against the nurse and disciplinary actions are not 
confidential. Subchapters B and C of Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code also 
authorize governmental agencies to share employee addresses and phone numbers. The 
public may access any of this information through a written request to the BNE. 
The BNE maintains this licensure database to support its mission of regulating the 
practice of nursing. The application, created exclusively for the BNE, was developed 
using a programming software tool called PowerBuilder. The licensure data is stored in a 
Microsoft SQL database. The Case Log Maintenance module tracks complaints made 
against nurses. The system is used to notify the complainant and the nurse of an ongoing 
investigation, assist investigators in tracking the progress of the investigation, and record 
the results of the investigation, including board action and violations of the Nursing 
Practice Act. 
In the sample selection process, the database was queried for Nursing Practice Act 
violations of nursing practice. The resulting list of sanctioned nurses was used as the 
study’s population. The only information that was used from the file containing the 
sample was the mailing addresses of sanctioned RNs, who were mailed a survey through 
the U.S. Postal Service. The accompanying cover letter asked for a voluntary, anonymous 
response. The address list was kept confidential in a locked file, and no one other than the 
researcher and information technology specialist viewed it. The list was destroyed once 
the surveys were mailed. 
All of the RNs in the sample were mailed a cover letter outlining the purpose and 
the voluntary and confidential nature of the study, which is included in Appendix D. In 
addition to the cover letter, a copy of the survey and a self-addressed, stamped envelope 
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were included. The return address was the researcher’s private P.O. box, provided solely 
for the purpose of this study. All of the outlined correspondence was sent to the 
participants’ mailing addresses to foster a sense of privacy and facilitate participation 
(Polit & Beck, 2004). The researcher collected the surveys daily and kept them in a 
secure office in a locked cabinet. Respondents were given two weeks to respond to the 
initial mailing. A reminder was sent two weeks after the initial mailing, again requesting 
participation and offering a two-week extension of the return date. After the timeline 
expired, the researcher began the analysis process. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Data from the surveys was entered into the SPSS Version 13 Data Analysis 
Program and Excel 2003. All descriptive and correlational analyses were conducted with 
these programs. The analyses included demographic data of the characteristics of the RN 
sample (age, education, years of licensure, etc.); data identified as system, health care 
team, patient, and individual factors involved in the error event; ordinal data reflecting 
the level of harm to the patient, and ordinal data ranking the level of breakdown in the 
nursing practice standard. 
Due to the types of data and commonly accepted rules of statistical analysis, 
nonparametric analyses were conducted on all five of the research questions, as follows: 
1. What is the demographic profile of RNs sanctioned by the BNE? 
Excel was utilized to compute frequency distributions and percentages of 
demographics of the sample. 
2. What are the incidences of individual, health care team, patient, and system 
threats and types of nursing errors reported by sanctioned nurses? 
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Excel was utilized to compute frequency distributions and percentages to describe 
the types of nursing errors, patient outcomes, and individual, patient, health care team, 
and system threats. 
3. What are the incidences of the level of harm to the patient as reported by 
sanctioned nurses? 
Excel was utilized to compute frequency distributions and percentages to describe 
the levels of harm to the patient. 
4. What relationships exist between the types of errors and the level of harm to the 
patient as reported by sanctioned nurses? 
SPSS was utilized to implement a Spearman’s rho correlational analysis of the 
ordinal data within the items capturing the type of nursing error and level of patient harm. 
5. What changes in practice do RNs sanctioned by the BNE describe after the error 
event, and what suggestions do they have for other nurses in preventing error 
events? 
Two open-ended questions were included in the modified TERCAP. These 
questions were, “Did the event change your nursing practice and, if so, how?” and 
“Based on what you have learned from the event, what suggestions would you pass on to 
help other nurses prevent practice breakdown and/or error events?” Analysis was 
conducted by coding the responses to these questions and developing themes related to 
the content (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). 
PROTECTION AND CONSENT OF PARTICIPANTS 
Before any data were collected, The University of Texas at Austin IRB and the 
Departmental Research Committee of the School of Nursing were asked to approve the 
study (Appendix E). IRB approval was obtained before implementation of the study 
(Appendix F). Once the survey instruments were returned, the mailing list was destroyed. 
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As outlined in the cover letter, completion and return of the instrument implied informed 
consent by the RNs. In an effort to promote privacy, the survey instruments were mailed 
to the respondents’ personal addresses. The respondents were apprised of the 
approximate time frame allowed for completion of the survey. Respondents were 
supplied with a stamped envelope to return the survey to the researcher’s private P.O. 
box. This mailbox was checked daily, and the survey instruments were kept in a secure 
office in a locked cabinet and destroyed once the study was completed. 
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Chapter 4: Presentation, Analysis, and Findings of the Data 
This chapter provides an overview of the results of the study. The data is 
presented in six sections: the first section provides a description of the sample while the 
other five sections present data regarding each research question in the study. To promote 
readability and because the majority of nurses are female, the respondents will be referred 
to as she. 
SURVEY RESULTS 
Survey Response 
The study population consisted of all of the RNs in Texas who received a 
disciplinary order from the BNE from December 2004 to December 2006 because of a 
violation of the Nursing Practice Act, Section 301.452 (b)(10)–(13) and Rule 217.12 
(1)(4). This comprised a study population of 613 RNs, all of whom were mailed a survey 
questionnaire. The participants were given two weeks to return the survey. Fifty of these 
were returned unopened, indicating that the addressee did not live at the mailing address. 
Ten days after the survey mailing, 45 completed surveys were returned. Subsequently, a 
postcard reminder was sent to all of the study population, minus the 50 with incorrect 
addresses. The postcard thanked the RNs for participating in the study and encouraged 
their participation if they hadn’t yet done so. They were given a two-week extension to 
return the survey. This reminder increased the responses by 17, resulting in 62 completed 
surveys. This number represents a 10% response rate.  
Several factors may have affected the response rate. First, because of the need for 
informed consent of the participants, the cover letter stated that the researcher was an 
employee of the BNE as well as a doctoral student. Even though all of the respondents’ 
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cases were settled and not subject to further review and the cover letter assured 
anonymity, some nurses may have thought that responding might affect their cases, thus 
dissuading them from participating. Secondly, receiving a sanction from the BNE may 
have been difficult for the participants, thus limiting their desire to review the experience. 
Lastly, the NCSBN, an organization that frequently conducts nursing survey research, 
recently noted that its response rate for a survey of advanced practice nurses was 
significantly lower (13%) than historical response rates of 40%. In a follow-up survey, 
the NCSBN randomly selected nurses (N not reported) from the mailing list and asked 
why they did not participate in the study. The recurring theme from the nurses was that 
they were “too busy” (NCSBN, 2006); thus, nurses’ feeling too busy may have affected 
the response rate in this study as well.  
To determine whether the sample was representative of the study population, all 
the demographic information from the respondents was compared with the demographics 
of the study population (Tables 3–7). Sixty-two surveys were utilized to analyze the 
demographic data for research question 1. Ten surveys were not included in the analysis 
of research questions 2, 3, and 4, resulting in the analysis of 52 (84%) of the survey 
responses. These surveys were eliminated because the respondents indicated that patient 
care was not a part of their sanctions by the BNE and/or they did not complete the Patient 
Profile and Patient Outcomes portions of the survey. Data analysis for research question 
5, two open-ended questions related to the participants’ qualitative descriptions of 
changes in practice resulting from the error event, was composed of 55 (88%) surveys for 
the first question and 53 surveys (85%) for the second question. 
Research Question 1  
1. What is the demographic profile of RNs sanctioned by the BNE? 
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Demographic characteristics of the sample at the time of the error event were 
analyzed. These characteristics included age, years of licensure, highest educational level, 
type of facility, assignment (position), whether or not the assignment was temporary, and 
whether the nurse was terminated or stayed with her employer. Five of these 
demographic characteristics (age, years of licensure, highest educational level, type of 
facility, and assignment) were also analyzed to evaluate whether the sample represented 
the entire population. Each demographic item in the sample and the population was 
evaluated to determine whether there was a margin of plus or minus 5% between the two 
groups to identify any notable differences between the sample and the population that 
might influence the representation of the findings (Heather Becker, personal 
communication, March 29, 2007). Though the survey response rate was only 10%, an 
analysis of the data indicated that the majority of the demographics in the sample 
reflected the population. A review of each of the demographic characteristics of the 
sample and a comparison with the demographics of the population is presented in Tables 
3 through 7.  
Table 3 and Table 4 present the data concerning reported age and years of 
licensure. The respondents’ reported ages ranged from 25 to 71 years with a mean age of 
47 years and a median age of 48 years. The standard deviation was 10.21 years.  
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Table 3: Age of BNE Population Compared With Age of Sample 
 All disciplined nurses Survey respondents 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Over (under) 
representation
Less than 25 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00 
25–34 65 10.60% 9 14.52% 3.92 
35–44 183 29.85% 12 19.35% (10.50) 
45–54 215 35.07% 24 38.71% 3.64 
55–64 126 20.55% 15 24.19% 3.64 
Over 65 24 3.92% 1 1.61% (2.31) 
No response 0 0.00% 1 1.61% 1.61 
Total 613 99.99% 62 99.99% 
 
Note. Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. 
As outlined in Table 3, the respondents’ ages reflect the population except for the 
35–44-year-old cohort, which is underrepresented. Table 4 presents an overview of the 
number of years the participants reported they had been licensed at the time of the error 
event. The respondents’ reported years of licensure at the time of the event ranged from 9 
months to 36 years. The mean for years of licensure was 14 years, the median was 13 
years, and the standard deviation was 10 years. The sample represented the population in 
years of licensure except for the 5–10-year range. Generally, the respondents’ ages and 
years of licensure reflect the population except for the 35–44-year-old cohort and the 
cohort that had been licensed 5 to 10 years. It may be that experienced nurses were more 
committed to telling their stories and more hopeful that doing so would improve the 
profession.  
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Table 4: Years Licensed When the Event Occurred 
 All disciplined nurses Survey respondents 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Over (under) 
representation
Less than 5 years 131 21.40% 11 17.74% (3.66%) 
5–10 years 183 29.90% 13 20.97% (8.93%) 
11–15 years 127 20.70% 11 17.74% (2.96%) 
16–20 years 64 10.40% 9 14.52% 4.12% 
21–25 years 56 9.10% 5 8.06% (1.04%) 
Over 25 years 52 8.50% 9 14.52% 6.02% 
No response 0 0.00% 4 6.45% 6.45% 
Total 613 100.00% 62 100.00%  
 
As shown in Table 5, while the largest group in the sample reported they had an 
Associate Degree in Nursing (ADN), the percentage of ADNs in the total population of 
disciplined nurses was even higher. The percentage of baccalaureate nurses was 
essentially the same in both groups. The respondents with ADN education were the only 
cohort that did not represent the overall population of disciplined RNs in Texas. The 
reasons nurses with baccalaureate and master’s degrees were more represented may relate 
to nurses with a higher educational level feeling more of a professional obligation to 
respond to a survey request by a doctoral student. The reason that diploma nurses may be 
more represented is that typically they are older and more traditional and may have felt 
more compelled to respond to the survey. 
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Table 5: Highest Degree Attained 
 All disciplined nurses Survey respondents 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Over (under) 
representation
Unknown 0 0.0% 1 1.6% 1.6% 
Diploma 39 6.4% 7 11.3% 4.9% 
Associate's 330 53.8% 27 43.5% (10.3%) 
Baccalaureate 194 31.6% 19 30.6% (1.0%) 
Master's 45 7.3% 8 12.9% 5.6% 
Ph.D. 5 0.8% 0 0.0% (0.8%) 
Total 613 99.9% 62 99.9%  
Note. Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. 
  
The information in Table 6 provides a breakdown of reported country of origin 
for prelicensure education. The majority reported that they were educated in the United 
States. However, foreign nurse graduates were slightly overrepresented in the sample. 
 
Table 6: Prelicensure Education 
 All disciplined nurses Survey respondents 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Over (under) 
representation
U.S. 566 92.0% 53 85.0% (7.0%) 
Foreign 35 6.0% 8 13.0% 7.0% 
Unknown 12 2.0% 1 2.0% 0.0% 
Total 613 100.0% 62 100.0% 
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The information in Table 7 shows the respondents’ primary places of 
employment. As noted, the overwhelming majority of survey respondents reported 
working in a hospital setting. When comparing primary place of employment between the 
sample and the study population, the labels for categories of employment in the modified 
TERCAP and the BNE database did not match exactly. For example, the modified 
TERCAP labeled categories Ambulatory Care, Office Based Surgery, and Physician’s 
Office, while the BNE database contained labels for certain similar categories named 
Physician or Dentist Office, Rural Health Clinics, and Free Standing Clinics. In order to 
provide comparisons between the sample and the population, these categories were 
collapsed and a new category named Offices and Clinics was created. Other employment 
categories in the modified TERCAP such as Hospitals, Home Care, and Long-Term 
Care, though labeled with slightly different names, matched the BNE database.  
As noted, nurses who reported working in the hospital setting were 
overrepresented in the sample. One reason for this may be that the survey items reflect an 
acute care model, which may have been more pertinent to hospital employees than others. 
For example, in the section System Factors, there are items such as staffing factors, 
inadequate patient acuity systems, and environmental factors that might have been more 
relevant to nurses in a hospital setting.  
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Table 7: Place of Employment 
 All disciplined nurses Survey respondents 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Over (under) 
representation
Hospitals 334 54.5% 43 69.4% 14.9% 
Offices and clinics 27 4.4% 5 8.0% 3.7% 
Home care 42 6.9% 6 9.7% 2.8% 
Long-term care 51 8.3% 5 8.1% (0.2%) 
Other 127 20.7% 3 4.8% (15.9%) 
No response 32 5.2% 0 0.0% (5.2%) 
Total 613 100.0% 62 100.0%  
 
Table 8 provides an overview of the assignments or types of positions held by the 
survey respondents. Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of respondents reported 
that they were direct patient care providers. Though the researcher was able to collapse 
and modify categories of employment settings between the survey responses and the 
BNE database, due the large number of categories of positions in the BNE database, this 
was not possible with positions in the modified TERCAP except for direct patient care 
providers. The BNE database and the TERCAP were matched with regard to direct 
patient care providers, and the survey sample was representative of the study population 
(61.3% of the survey respondents identified themselves as being direct patient care 
providers while 62.6% of the RNs in the BNE database identified themselves as staff 
nurses). 
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Table 8: Assignment (Position) of Survey Respondents 
 Number Percentage 
Direct patient care provider 38 61 % 
Team leader 0 0 % 
Charge nurse 6 10 % 
Nurse manager/supervisor 4  7 % 
Combination patient care/manager 12 19 % 
Other 2 3 % 
Total 62 100 % 
 
 
To ascertain whether the nurse was in a permanent versus a temporary position, 
questions about employment status were included. As shown in Table 9, the majority of 
the nurses were permanent employees. There is no comparative data within the 
population of disciplined nurses. 
 
Table 9: Temporary Employees 
 Number Percentage 
Yes 10 16.0% 
No 47 76.0% 
No response 5 8.0% 
Total 62 100.0% 
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Information about the nurses’ employment status after the error event is provided 
in Table 10. It is interesting to note that the majority of nurses responded that they were 
either dismissed or asked to resign in lieu of termination.  
 
Table 10: Employment Outcomes 
 Number Percentage 
Dismissed or asked to resign 39 63 % 
Resigned 6 10 % 
Other 1 2 % 
Stayed with employer 16 26 % 
Total 62 101 % 
Note. Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. 
Research Question 2  
2. What are the incidences of individual, health care team, patient and system 
threats, and types of errors as reported by sanctioned nurses?  
As outlined in Chapter 1, the TEMM acknowledges the limitations of humans and 
systems in the commission of errors and strives for error management rather than error 
avoidance. The limitations found within humans and systems are called Threats. The 
items in the modified TERCAP support the concepts found in the TEMM; however, 
instead of being called Threats, the instrument items are labeled Factors. The following 
review of the data will utilize the modified TERCAP nomenclature as outlined in the 
study’s definitions. 
Table 11 outlines the reported level of patient harm and the incidences of 
individual, health care team, and system threats in each level of harm. Table 12 reflects 
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the reported level of patient harm and the incidences of patient factors in each level of 
harm. Table 13 outlines the reported incidences of each type of error.  
In the evaluation of Individual Factors, 36 (69%) of the respondents identified at 
least one factor in their own practice that affected the error event. As noted in Table 11, 
the two most frequently cited individual factors were Fatigue (27%) and Inexperience 
(21%). The most frequent response (5) in the Other category was from nurses who felt 
physically ill at the time of the error event. Though the modified TERCAP included 
mental illness as an item under Individual Factors, it did not have an item for physical 
illness. 
When selecting members of the Health Care Team who were involved in the error 
event, 42 (81%) identified at least one other member of the team. The most frequently 
selected members of the team were Staff Nurses (44%), Supervisory Nurses (35%), and 
Physicians (35%). Forty-two (81%) of the respondents also noted at least one factor 
related to the health care team that contributed to the error. As noted in Table 11, the 
most frequently identified were Communication Factors (54%) and Lack of Teamwork 
(44%). There was only one comment in the Other category for Health Care Team 
Factors that provided additional information. This nurse indicated that even though the 
physicians exonerated her after the error event, she was still reported to the BNE. This 
comment may reflect a hierarchy gradient where physicians are viewed as the leaders of 
the health care team and are able to deem what is and is not an error. 
System Factors were identified as contributing to errors by 46 (88%) of the 
respondents. As outlined in Table 11, the two most frequently cited factors were related 
to Staffing (60%) and Management Issues (44%). Five statements in the Other category 
provided additional information. Two respondents reported not having access to 
equipment; two respondents said their employers did not understand pertinent regulatory 
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rules including the BNE’s rules and rules about advanced practice nurses. One 
respondent felt pressured by her employer to come to work when sick.  
Forty-eight (92%) respondents selected at least one item from the Other System 
and Team Factors section of the modified TERCAP. As outlined in Table 11, the two 
most cited factors were Lack of Team Support (58%) and High Work Volume (56%). 
Notable comments in the Other category came from one respondent indicating that, 
because she was the charge nurse, she was blamed even though she wasn’t present. The 
other comment outlined an issue with an Omni-cell (medication dispensing unit) that was 
stocked with two different IV fluids side by side that looked exactly the same.  
The modified TERCAP instrument had three separate sections for System 
Factors, Health Care Team Factors, and Other System and Team Factors. To ascertain 
all of the system and health care team factors, these sections were collapsed and 
analyzed. The majority of the factors identified by the respondents as contributions in 
their error events were System Factors (N = 145) and Health Care Team Factors (N = 
151), as compared to incidences of Patient Factors (N = 86) and Individual Factors (N = 
47). In those error events that involved some level of patient harm, System Factors (N = 
47) and Health Care Team Factors (N = 42) also composed the majority of identified 
factors, while Patient Factors (N = 33) and Individual Factors (N =18) ranked lower.  
Table 12 presents reported patient factors that contributed to the error events. 
Thirty-nine respondents (75%) indicated that at least one patient factor was involved in 
the error event. There were no predominant types of patient factors that contributed to 
errors, however; among the most commonly cited factors were Altered Consciousness, 
Cognitive Impairment, and Communication Difficulties, all of which would make it 
difficult for the patient to communicate with the nurse. The three least-reported patient 
factors were Insomnia, Depression, and Sensory Deficits. Most of the comments (N = 14) 
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in the Other section related to increased patient acuity such as occurs with end-stage renal 
disease and/or multiple health care problems. Two respondents described problems 
controlling the patient’s pain. 
Table 13 provides a breakdown of the eight types of errors. As outlined, the 
instrument provided a mechanism for the respondent to rank (“did not,” “moderately,” or 
“greatly”) the contribution of the types of errors to their own error event. Respondents 
indicated that the majority of errors listed in the modified TERCAP did not contribute to 
their error events (N = 253 selections for all error types). However, there were 145 
selections that indicated the errors either moderately or greatly contributed to the error 
event. The most frequently selected types of errors were Documentation (53.8%) and 
Medication Administration (44.2%). Of the errors that respondents selected as greatly 
contributing to their error events, again Documentation (30.8%) and Medication 
Administration (28.8%) were the most frequently selected. The two most frequently 
reported errors that moderately contributed to the respondents’ error events were 
Intervention (25.0%) and Documentation (23.1%).  
 
Table 11: All Factors by Patient Outcome 




n = 7 
Significant 
harm 
n = 6 
 
Harm 
n = 5 
No harm 
n = 33 
No 
response 
n = 1 
Grand 
total 
n = 52 
System factors 
Communication  2 1 1 7 0 11 (21%) 
Environmental 2 3 2 7 0 14 (27%) 
Management  4 2 0 17 0 23 (44%) 
Backup/support 2 4 1 8 0 15 (29%) 
Staffing 4 3 3 21 0 31 (60%) 








n = 7 
Significant 
harm 
n = 6 
 
Harm 
n = 5 
No harm 
n = 33 
No 
response 
n = 1 
Grand 
total 
n = 52 
Health care team factors 
Communication  3 3 2 19 1 28 (54%)
Lack of teamwork 4 4 0 15 0 23 (44%)
Inadequate pt. support 2 1 0 6 0 9 (17%)
Unwritten unit customs 3 0 0 13 1 17 (33%)
Other 0 0 0 2 0 2 (4%)
Individual nursing factors 
Inexperience 3 3 2 3 0 11 (21%)
Fatigue 2 1 1 10 0 14 (27%)
Mental health issues 1 1 0 2 0 4 (8%)
Language barriers 0 0 0 1 0 1 (2%)
Drug/substance abuse 0 0 1 2 0 3 (6%)
Other 1 1 1 10 1 14 (27%)
Other system and team factors 
No breaks 0 0 0 7 0 7 (13%)
Lack of orientation/ 
training 1 1 1 7 0 10 (19%)
High work volume 2 4 3 20 0 29(56%)
Conflict w/team 0 1 1 13 0 15 (29%)
Overwhelming 
assignments 2 2 2 15 0 21 (40%)
Lack of team support 3 4 3 20 0 30 (58%)
Other  2 0 0 4 0 6 (12%)
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Table 12: Patient Factors by Patient Outcome 





n = 7 
Significant 
harm 
n = 6 
 
Harm 
n = 5 
No harm 
n = 33 
No 
response 
n = 1 
Grand 
total 
n = 52 
Agitation  2 1 1 8 0 12 
Altered consciousness 4 1 1 6 1 13 
Cognitively impaired  2 2 1 5 0 10 
Communication 
difficulties 
1 2 0 6 0 9 
Depression 1 0 1 2 0 4 
Inadequate coping 1 1 1 8 0 11 
Incontinence 2 2 0 4 1 9 
Insomnia 1 0 0 3 0 4 
Sensory deficits 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Other 4 0 0 10 0 14 
Total  19 9 5 53 2  
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No. Pctg. No. Pctg. No. Pctg. No. Pctg. 
Medication 
  administration 
15 29% 8 15% 27 52% 2 4%
Documentation 16 31% 12 23% 21 40% 3 6%
Attentiveness/ 
   surveillance 
10 19% 6 12% 34 65% 2 4%
Clinical evaluation 8 15% 8 15% 34 65% 2  4%
Prevention 6 12% 5 10% 39 75% 2  4%
Intervention 6 12% 13 25% 30 58% 3  6%
Interpretation of doctors'  
   orders 
13 25% 5 10% 32 62% 2  4%
Patient advocacy 6 12% 8 15% 36 69% 2  4%
 
Research Question 3 
3. What are the incidences of the level of harm to the patient as reported by 
sanctioned nurses? 
Table 11 provides descriptive data about the incidences of the level of patient 
harm according to system, health care team, and individual factors. As shown, 33 
respondents (63%) noted that there was no harm from the error, while 13 respondents 
(25%) reported that the error resulted in significant patient harm or death. To delineate 
this further, 13% of the nurses reported errors that may have caused a patient’s death, 
while 12% reported errors that caused significant harm. Among the errors that did not 
result in patient harm, the most frequently cited contributing factors were found within 
Other System and Team Factors (37%), while the least frequently cited factors were 
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Individual Nursing Factors (12%). Of the 13 respondents who reported that their errors 
resulted in significant patient harm or death, the most frequently cited factors were 
System Factors (34%) and the least frequently cited were Individual Nursing Factors 
(16%). 
The information presented in Table 12 outlines the respondents’ ranking of the 
level of patient harm and the patient factors (behaviors) that may have contributed to the 
error. Of interest is the mean number of times a patient factor was selected according to 
the patient’s outcome. For example, reported errors that resulted in a patient death had a 
mean of 2.7 patient-related factors. Patients who were significantly harmed had a mean of 
1.5 factors, while patients with harm had a mean of 1 factor. These frequencies may be 
related to the acuity of the patients rendering them more vulnerable and prone to poorer 
outcomes. Table 14 provides descriptive data of the patients’ reported ages and the level 
of harm, which indicates that the largest group of patients was elderly. Those who died 
were fairly evenly split between children, adults and the elderly.  
 




n = 7 
Significant 
harm 
n = 6 
Harm 
n = 5 
No harm 
n = 33 
No 
response 
n = 1 
Total 
n = 52 
Infant    2  2 
Child 2   1 1 4 
Adolescent  1  2  3 
Adult 2 2 2 12  18 
Elderly 3 3 2 14  22 
No response   1 2  3 
Total 7 (13%) 6 (12%) 5 (10%) 33 (63%) 1 (2%) 52 
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Research Question 4 
4. What relationships exist between the types of errors and the level of harm to 
the patient as reported by sanctioned nurses? 
A Spearman’s rho analysis is provided in Table 15. As shown, there was a 
significant correlation between the patient outcome and two types of errors: Clinical 
Evaluation (0.35, p = 0.05) and Attentiveness/Surveillance (0.31, p = 0.05). Of interest is 
that there was also a notable but not significant inverse relationship between the level of 
the patient outcome and two certain types of errors—Medication Administration (–0.24) 
and Interpretation of Doctors’ Orders (–0.13). This inverse relationship may be due to 
both of these types of errors having the fewest incidences of patient outcomes that 
contributed to death or serious harm while also being among the most frequently 
identified types of errors.
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Table 15: Relationship Between Types of Errors and Patient Outcome (N = 50) 
Spearman’s rho correlations  


















coefficient 1       Outcome 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .       
Correlation 
coefficient –0.24 1      
Medication 
admin. 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.09 .      
Correlation 
coefficient –0.09 –0.00 1     Documentation 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.55 0.99 .     
Correlation 
coefficient 0.31* 0.04 0.22 1    Attentiveness 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.03 0.77 0.12 .    
Correlation 
coefficient 0.35* –0.08 0.32* 0.64** 1    Clinical evaluation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01 0.60 0.03 0 .    
Correlation 
coefficient –0.03 0.08 0.12 0.29* 0.28* 1   Prevention 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.85 0.61 0.41 0.04 0.05 .   
Correlation 
coefficient 0.00 0.16 0.23 0.35* 0.43** 0.31* 1  Intervention 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.99 0.26 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.03 .  
Correlation 
coefficient –0.13 –0.03 0.26 0.21 0.26 –0.06 0.18 1 Doctors’ orders 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.39 0.85 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.66 0.23 . 
Correlation 
coefficient 0.01 0.03 0.27 0.41** 0.41** 0.18 0.64** 0.29* 1 Patient advocacy 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.96 0.85 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.22 0 0.05 .
  * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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In an effort to investigate other types of relationships between patient outcomes 
and types of error, the researcher reviewed whether the reported error greatly or 
moderately contributed to the error event. Table 16 reflects this information. Respondents 
indicated that the majority of errors did not cause harm. For those errors that harmed a 
patient or may have lead to their death, there was an even distribution of frequencies 
between the categories, Documentation, Attentiveness, Clinical Evaluation and 
Intervention and the categories Medication Administration, Prevention, MD Orders and 
Patient Advocacy. It was interesting to note that there were many more incidences of 
errors that caused patient death or significant patient harm than those errors that caused 
harm alone.  
 
Table 16: Types of Errors (by Degree of Contribution) and Patient Outcomes 
 
Patient Death 
n = 7 
Significant 
Harm 
n = 6 
Harm 
n = 5 
No Harm 
n = 33 
 Great Mod. Great Mod. Great Mod. Great Mod. Total 
Medication 
  administration 
1 0 2 1 1 0 11 7 23 
Documentation 1 3 3 1 1 0 11 8 28 
Attentiveness 2 1 4 1 0 1 4 3 16 
Clinical 
   evaluation 1 2 3 3 0 1 4 2 16 
Prevention 1 0 0 2 0 1 5 2 11 
Intervention 5 1 1 3 0 1 4 8 23 
MD orders 3 0 1 0 0 0 9 5 18 
Patient  
   advocacy 0 2 2 1 0 0 4 5 14 
TOTAL 14 9 16 12 2 4 52 40  
Note. “Great” means “greatly contributed,” and “Mod.” means “moderately contributed.” 
 91
Research Question 5 
5.  What changes in practice do RNs sanctioned by the BNE describe after the error 
event, and what suggestions do they have for other nurses in preventing error events? 
Research question 5 provided qualitative data from two open-ended questions in 
the instrument. Because the modified TERCAP is a quantitative instrument, it was 
determined that adding two open-ended questions would provide a mechanism to capture 
the RNs’ perceptions of contributions to errors by using their own words. The benefit of 
using the participants’ narratives is that it provides a much more comprehensive and 
multifaceted perspective on the research topic (Polit & Beck, 2004).  
The two open-ended questions were the following: 
1. Did this event change your practice and if so, how? 
2. Based on what you learned from the event, what suggestions would you pass 
on to help other nurses prevent practice breakdown and/or error events?  
Of the 62 respondents, 55 (88%) responded to the first question and 53 (85%) to 
the second, giving 170 comments that provided the opportunity to identify common 
themes. The responses were comprehensive and provided rich information supporting the 
investigation of recurring themes. These themes were initially developed from the items 
in the modified TERCAP instrument, which depicts concepts contained in the TEMM as 
outlined in Chapter 1. This method supports the iterative process important for testing 
models and building theories (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Additional themes were developed 
from narratives that did not fit into the conceptual model provided by the TEMM and the 





Question 1: Did this event change your practice, and if so, how? 
Table 17 outlines 85 responses regarding whether the event changed the RNs’ 
practice. Initially, these responses were categorized under the themes found in the 
modified TERCAP, including Assessment of System Factors, Health Care Team Factors, 
Individual Factors, Other System and Health Care Team Factors, and Eight Standards of 
Practice. Four (5%) of the participants indicated that the event did not change their 
practice. In research question one, there were no responses that related to System Factors 
and only one related to Patient Factors.  
Changes in Practice Related to Health Care Team Factors 
As shown in Table 17, there were 18 responses related to Health Care Team 
Factors, including comments related to specific members of the team. Though the 
instrument provides nine categories of health care personnel who may be involved in 
error events, only two members of the health care team, physicians and staff nurses, were 
identified with changes in practice. Two respondents said that they were less trusting of 
physicians because of ethical issues and problems with verbal orders. Four respondents 
reported they were less trusting of other nurses, primarily coworkers. Two of these 
respondents commented that “nurses eat their own.” This theme of mistrust also emerged 
from five comments by respondents that indicated a global mistrust since the error event. 
Of these five responses, two respondents commented, “I do not trust anyone.” One 
respondent described a lack of trust because of staff questioning her ability. One 
individual reported that she no longer trusts the profession in general, and another stated, 
“You never know who will turn on you.” In conjunction with trust issues, conflict with 
the team was also reported by three respondents. One of these individuals characterized 
the event as resulting in “a black mark made against me.” Similar concerns were voiced 
by the other two respondents, who indicated that people “twist words,” “make life 
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miserable,” and “treat you like an enemy and outsider.” On the other hand, one 
respondent did verbalize the importance of trusting all members of the health care team. 
The need for trust may also have been considered by four respondents whose comments 
supported the need for Greater Team Work since the error event. One of these individuals 
emphasized the importance of seeking aid from trusted coworkers. Two respondents 
stressed the importance of working with every member of the health care team, and one 
also suggested supporting the next shift. Communication with peers and nursing 
administration was also endorsed by one respondent. One respondent indicated that she 
was less apt to go by unwritten protocols and now calls the MD first.  
 
Table 17: Summary of Respondents’ Comments to the Question, “Did This Event 
Change Your Practice, and If So, How?” 
Categories of the modified TERCAP/other themes Number of comments 
Changes in practice relating to health care team members 6 
Physicians – less trusting of 2 
Staff nurses – less trusting of 4 
Changes in practice relating to health care team factors 12 
Greater teamwork 4 
Conflict with team 3 
Additional themes for health care team factors:  
Don’t trust others 5 
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Table 17 continued  
Categories of the modified TERCAP/other themes Number of comments 
Changes in practice relating to individual factors 40 
Substance abuse 3 
Mental health   3 
Additional themes for individual factors:  
Increased self-reliance:  
I trust myself to do the right thing  7 
If I don’t feel confident, I don’t do it 4 
Increased my education 2 
Reduced self-confidence  9 
Slowed down and reduced stress 3 
Know and follow the rules 3 
Humbled/know I can’t handle it all  2 
Someone else’s fault   4 
Changes in practice relating to patient factors 1 
Changes in practice relating to specific types of error 11 
Documentation 8 
Attentiveness/surveillance 2 
Interpretation of doctors’ orders 1 
Did not change my practice 4 
No longer work in nursing 11 
Total number of comments 85 
 
Changes in Practice Related to Individual Factors  
Table 17 outlines 40 responses related to changes the individuals made in their 
practice after the error events. Of these comments, only six were related to items 
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identified in the TERCAP, which included Substance Abuse and Mental Health. All of 
the other comments required the development of additional themes, reflecting the 
richness and complexity of the RNs’ responses to how their practice changed after the 
error events. Within the theme Substance Abuse, three comments were made. One person 
simply stated that it was an issue. One respondent commented that her immaturity and 
marital problems contributed to her issues. One respondent, stating that she had become 
addicted to pain medications, said “I can’t blame the situation on anyone or anything 
else” and claimed that nurses need an outlet to vent without fear of retaliation.  
There were three themes concerning mental health issues. One respondent said 
she was in therapy for six months after the event. This person stated that she now has a 
safe job and that “it has been a long journey.” One nurse stated that she got depressed and 
lost her license. She wants to get it back but can’t because of “forces that human beings 
create.” One nurse described the event as taking a “psychological toll.”  
Seven additional themes emerged relating individual factors. Of particular interest 
were comments that portrayed two opposing themes, the first being Increased Self-
Reliance and the second being Reduced Sense of Confidence, related to not trusting 
oneself and being more fearful and cautious. Eleven statements supported the theme 
Increased Self-Reliance, with seven nurses advocating for a sense of trust in oneself to do 
the right thing and four describing not doing things in their practice they don’t feel 
confident to do. Within the theme I trust myself to do the right thing, two respondents 
reported trusting their instincts more. Three nurses described gaining confidence and 
being more assertive and diligent. One participant said that since the event, she directly 
confronts a situation, while another stated that she now protects her license. There were 
four statements concerning the theme If I don’t feel confident, I don’t do it. One 
respondent stated that she would abort a study or cancel a procedure if “everything is not 
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in its place.” Two respondents reported having learned to say no, including refusing 
assignments if they are unsure or uncomfortable. One respondent learned “I should not 
bite off more than I can chew.” All of the comments in Increased Self Reliance indicated 
that, subsequent to the error event, the respondents felt more empowered and confident to 
do the right thing. 
There were nine comments reflecting the theme Reduced Sense of Confidence 
where respondents indicated they had lost trust in themselves since the error events. Two 
of these respondents said that they were fearful since the event. Three respondents said 
they were much more cautious since the event. One respondent said that the event “made 
me second guess myself.” Two respondents described themselves as being extremely 
careful and hesitant. The last respondent who commented on this theme reported that she 
does not volunteer to do anything that is not absolutely necessary. 
Other themes emerged related to the respondents’ recognizing changes in 
themselves. For example, three respondents realized that since the error events, they had 
Slowed Down and Reduced Stress in their lives. Three respondents also discussed 
Knowing and Following Rules, such as knowing the five rights of medication 
administration and adhering to professional boundaries. Another theme, Humbled/Know I 
Can’t Handle It All, emerged from two respondents, both advanced practice nurses.  
An interesting theme, Someone Else’s Fault, emerged from four respondents’ 
narratives describing the error events as not being their fault but perpetuated by others. 
One nurse indicated that she “took the fall” while another said that the error occurred 
because the director of nursing “called the shots.” One respondent said the error event 
made her realize there is “such a term as discrimination.” One nurse listed all of the good 
things she had done and all the bad things others had done (such as sleeping on the job) 
and commented that she was “a good nurse, not like other nurses.” 
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Changes in Practice Related to Patient Factors 
Only one respondent described an error event involving a patient. The theme of 
Agitation/Combativeness was captured in the modified TERCAP Patient Profile section. 
This respondent reported having a fear of being harmed by a patient. After the event, she 
did not want to practice nursing for a while and feared working with persons who had 
mental illness.  
Change in Practice Related to Types of Errors 
Table 17 outlines 11 responses related to changes in practice according to the type 
of error. The Eight Standards of Practice section in the modified TERCAP provided 
information related to issues in meeting the standard that contributed to the error event. 
The types of errors identified by the respondents were Documentation, 
Attentiveness/Surveillance, and Interpretation of Doctors’ Orders. Of the group who 
identified types of errors, the majority (8) indicated that they increased the quantity and 
quality of their documentation. Terms such as “now fully document each intervention” 
and “more thorough in my documentation” were common. One respondent indicated that 
“documentation is 50% of the job.” There were two comments concerning changes 
related to Attentiveness/Surveillance of the patient. One respondent said she was more 
attentive, and one reported that she was more observant. Changes in the Interpretation of 
Doctors Orders were reported by one respondent who indicated that the event made her 
more thorough in reviewing physicians’ orders. 
No Longer Work in Nursing  
Eleven comments indicated that the respondents no longer worked in nursing. 
Two simply stated that they were no longer working or had left nursing. Two respondents 
received limited license orders, causing one to retire and one to feel very humiliated 
because of earning $5.00 an hour as a receptionist. One person could no longer practice 
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because she surrendered her license and was unable to find a job in nursing. One nurse 
reported being unable to work at all for 1.5 years and couldn’t pay bills, causing her to 
file bankruptcy and lose all she owned. Four respondents said that they had changed 
careers. One of the four became “burned out” and reported working in another field 
making more money. One said she now works as a security guard making minimum 
wage, while another reported pursuing a former position of administrative assistant 
because there is “no situational stress” as there is in nursing. The last respondent who left 
nursing said she is in school to change careers due to her disenchantment with the 
profession. Though respondents’ comments included some expression of stress or 
disappointment, there were two comments about leaving the profession that were 
particularly poignant. One respondent wrote, “Yes I quit nursing. I was told at school and 
work, nurses eat their own. Nurses do hurt other nurses…. I love the profession of 
nursing with all of its responsibilities: it is the team and the environment that kills nurses 
new and old.” The last respondent commented, “Yes, I will never again practice nursing; 
it is simply not worth the emotional stress.” 
Besides feelings of devastation and loss, the comments of respondents who 
reported leaving nursing were reviewed to ascertain issues of trust and/or decreased self-
reliance. Two respondents commented on a lack of trust, one regarding a general mistrust 
overall and one advising other nurses not to rely on physicians. There were no comments 
indicating a better sense of or need for trust in oneself or others. Additionally, none of the 
respondents who had left nursing indicated a sense of increased self-reliance, suggesting 
that the respondents who did learn how to become more self-reliant stayed in nursing. 
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Question Two: Based on what you learned from the event, what suggestions would you 
pass on to help other nurses prevent practice breakdown and/or error events? 
Table 18 provides information from 85 responses regarding suggestions the 
respondents would pass on to other nurses to prevent practice breakdown and/or error 
events. As with the first question, the responses to question two were initially categorized 
under the themes found in the modified TERCAP. All of the sections of the modified 
TERCAP instrument were utilized in developing thematic categories from the responses. 
When the instrument category did not provide a theme for the response, additional 
themes were developed.  
Suggestions to Nurses Related to System Factors 
Table 18 outlines the ten responses related to System Factors contained in the 
modified TERCAP. Five comments related to the theme Management, two indicating that 
nurses shouldn’t rely on management for support and another stressing the need for more 
management support. One comment called for more nurses and ancillary staff, and one 
nurse cautioned against putting too much faith in support from monitoring equipment. 
Orientation/Training issues were discussed by two respondents, suggesting that nurses 
should make sure their employers orient them thoroughly. An additional theme under 
System Factors was developed in response to comments by three respondents. Create 
Support Groups was developed because three respondents advocated for support groups 
to help nurses vent and have open discussions about patient problems without penalties. 
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Table 18: Summary of Respondents’ Comments to the Question, “Based on What You 
Learned From the Event, What Suggestions Would You Pass on to Help 
Other Nurses Prevent Practice Breakdown and/or Error Events?” 
Categories of the modified TERCAP/other themes Number of comments 
Suggestions related to system factors 10 
Management  5 
Orientation/training 2 
Additional theme:  
Create support groups 3 
Suggestions relating to health care team members 10 
Physicians/nurse practitioners:  
Get support from and get to know 2 
Don’t trust 2 
Staff nurse/co-workers:  
Don’t trust 4 
Trust 2 
Suggestions relating to health care team factors 21 
Better communication  6 
Greater teamwork 12 
Additional theme:  




Table 18 continued  
Categories of the modified TERCAP/other themes Number of comments 
Suggestions relating to individual factors 31 
Additional themes:  
Increased self-reliance:  
Trust yourself to do the right thing 10 
If you don’t feel confident, don’t do it 4 
Ask for help 4 
Know and follow the rules 6 
Slow down/be more thorough 7 
Suggestions relating to patient factors 1 
Suggestions relating to specific types of error 12 
Documentation 8 
Attentiveness/surveillance 2 
Patient advocacy 2 
Total number of comments 85 
 
 
Suggestions to Other Nurses Related to Health Care Team Factors 
Table 18 outlines 10 responses related to specific Team Members and 21 
responses related to Health Care Team Factors. Ten of these comments concerned 
specific members of the health care team. As in question one, where the respondents 
commented on changes in their practice, the theme of trust in relationships between 
specific health care workers emerged. Six respondents advised not trusting physicians, 
nurse practitioners, and other staff nurses. Two of these respondents advised nurses not to 
count on the physicians or nurse practitioners to back up verbal orders or get too 
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comfortable in working relationships with physicians. Four respondents suggested not 
trusting other nurses and coworkers; two warned nurses not to trust each other to watch 
their patients; and one said not to take the word of another nurse/coworker. One person 
advised nurses not to rely on ancillary staff when completing assessments. In contrast, 
four respondents advised nurses to increase their trust of other members of the health care 
team. These comments advised nurses to get to know physicians and nurse practitioners 
and encouraged calling the MDs. One respondent described nursing as a job that must be 
“preformed with trust with your coworkers.” One respondent also indicated a need to call 
the hospital supervisor when in a dangerous situation.  
There were 21 comments relating to Health Care Team Factors. Six of these 
comments related to the theme of Better Communication. Examples of better 
communication included a comment about good communication between peers in 
English; a warning that nurses should tell someone if they get into a situation where they 
cannot care for their patients; a call for open discussions; and advice to go over every 
order with the nurse giving report. Twelve comments related to the theme Greater 
Teamwork. Within this theme, there were four general statements about building rapport 
and teamwork. Other respondents suggested getting involved in hospital committees and 
counting on nursing coworkers to witness medication administration. Three respondents 
identified issues with shift changes and stressed the importance of working with the 
oncoming nurses. The most descriptive of the statements about teamwork was from a 
nurse who stated that it is “better to be surrounded by hundreds of helping hands and 
minds.” 
As provided in comments indicating a global trust or mistrust of others outlined in 
question one, a theme about trust emerged. However, though there were eight 
respondents who answered question one by outlining changes in their practice that 
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reflected a global mistrust of others since the error event, only one respondent answered 
question two by advising nurses not to trust others. This respondent stated, “Be aware of 
as many hidden agendas as possible. Keep your friends close and your enemies closer.” 
There were three comments recommending trusting others to help prevent error events. 
One of these comments stated that nurses should build an atmosphere of trust and 
understanding, while another advised to “find somebody you trust.” 
Suggestions to Other Nurses Related to Individual Factors 
Table 18 outlines 31 comments related to recommendations in Individual Factors. 
None of the individual factors from the modified TERCAP were identified, but five 
themes were developed to describe comments from the respondents. As in the responses 
outlined in Question One, Increased Self-Reliance emerged as a theme. This theme was 
developed into two sub-themes: Trust yourself to do the right thing and If you don’t feel 
confident, don’t do it. These two themes had a total of 14 comments, 10 of them relating 
to the first theme, Trust yourself to do the right thing. Three of these 10 were suggestions 
advising nurses to complete clinical tasks themselves. Two respondents addressed 
working conditions; one advised nurses to refuse to work in unsafe conditions; and the 
other stated “If administration is not supportive—get out!” One person suggested taking 
care of yourself first, while another stated “demand help, demand teaching.” Two 
respondents wrote about improving their own clinical skills, and one person suggested 
checking on coworkers even though they might be friends. Two comments advised 
nurses to voice complaints to supervisors, and two comments related to completely 
checking out an employer before going to work for them.  
Four comments related to the theme If you don’t feel confident, don’t do it. One 
respondent advised nurses not to take an assignment unless they felt confident with it. 
One person stated, “Do not let anyone bully you into another course of action,” while 
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another cautioned against doing something if unsure or feeling badly about a situation. 
One respondent advised taking safe harbor, a process that provides protection for nurses 
when they are forced to take an assignment that does not meet BNE requirements.  
Another theme was developed from comments suggesting that nurses Ask for 
Help. Of the four respondents, two simply suggested asking for help. Another advised 
seeking help when not familiar with the signs and symptoms of a disease, and one 
suggested seeking help when having personal problems. There were seven comments that 
related to the theme Slow Down and Be More Thorough. Two respondents simply said 
nurses should slow down or don’t rush. Another suggested not being pressured by time, 
while another respondent advised against administering a medication without reviewing 
the entire chart. One respondent made the statement, “Be on your task at hand,” while 
another stated, “Take your time, do not rush, and follow procedures.” There were six 
comments suggesting that nurses Know and Follow the Rules. One respondent suggested 
that nurses should enforce hospital guidelines and report to JCAHO a hospital that 
doesn’t follow its own policies. Three respondents suggested following nursing policies 
and rules. One respondent reiterated the need to adhere to professional boundaries. Two 
respondents stressed the importance of knowing and following the Nursing Practice Act.  
Suggestions to Other Nurses Related to Patient Factors 
Only one comment related to the theme Patient Factors, and it was the same 
respondent who addressed the theme in Question One. This respondent stated, “Nurses 
should always be aware of physical threat(s) by an outraged patient. Know that if you 
find yourself being threatened, [there will be] no one around to assist ... with the patient. 
You can't run or get away. Protect your face and body and let him beat the hell out of 
you. For it [is] far better for you to be injured or killed than protecting yourself from the 
BNE [who] says there is no such thing as self defense in nursing.” 
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Suggestions to Other Nurses Related to Types of Errors 
Table 18 outlines 12 comments advising nurses to change their practice to address 
specific types of errors. Four types of errors were highlighted: Documentation, 
Attentiveness/Surveillance, Interpretation of Doctors’ Orders, and Patient Advocacy. As 
in responses to Question One, the most frequently identified type of error (N = 8) was 
Documentation. Two of the respondents said to document carefully, appropriately, and 
accordingly. One respondent said to fully document each intervention, while another 
suggested taking time to document. One simply stated, “Document, document, 
document.” One person suggested that “it is more important to care about documentation 
than care about patients.” One respondent warned to make sure that a DNR (do not 
resuscitate order) is in the chart, while another respondent advised, “Cover your work 
with complete charting about incidents, either in the chart or with an incident report.” 
Three respondents commented on the importance of the Interpretation of Doctors’ 
Orders. One wrote that nurses should not assume particular interventions are covered by 
a physician’s orders, while another stressed the importance of completing doctor’s orders. 
One respondent advised nurses not to count on the MD to back up verbal orders and to 
reverify verbal orders. Though there were no comments on the Patient Advocacy theme 
in Question One, two respondents spoke to it in Question Two as a way to prevent error 
events. One person suggested that nurses should insist that a physician come see a patient 
when symptoms warrant it. The last comment addressing patient advocacy stressed 
starting CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) no matter how long the patient had been 
left unattended.  
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SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the results of the study’s findings. The participant’s 
demographics were described and were found to be representative of the total population 
of RNs who had been disciplined by the BNE for not meeting standards of nursing 
practice between December 2004 and December 2006. Through the quantitative 
component of the modified TERCAP, system and health care team factors were the most 
frequently selected as contributing to the respondents’ error events. Reported patient 
outcomes indicated that 25% of the error events contributed to serious patient harm or 
death. There was a significant relationship between patient outcomes and the Clinical 
Evaluation and Attentiveness/Surveillance types of errors. Data analysis from 108 
comments provided qualitative descriptions of changes nurses made in their practice 
since the error events and suggestions they would make to other nurses to prevent error 
events.  
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Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section presents a summary of the 
study, including the purpose, the research questions, the methodology, and a summation 
of the findings. The second reviews the findings for each research question, limitations of 
the findings, and conclusions, and the third section offers recommendations for nursing 
theory, practice, policy, and research as suggested from the study’s findings.  
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this descriptive, exploratory study was to examine the perceptions 
of RNs who had been sanctioned by a board of nursing to ascertain categories of practice 
errors and identify individual, health care team, patient, and system threats that 
contributed to an error and/or patient harm. The TEMM was utilized as a framework for 
examining the phenomena that promote or hinder patient safety. Using a modified 
version of the TERCAP instrument, sanctioned RNs selected types of errors associated 
with a breakdown in their nursing practice. In addition, they identified factors that 
contributed to their errors, including individual, health care team, patient, and system 
factors. Associations between the levels of patient harm and types of error were 
examined. A nationally developed instrument to collect information about nursing 
practice errors was modified for the study. Content review through cognitive interviews, 
pilot testing and test-retest analysis all contributed to an examination of the instrument’s 
reliability and validity. 
Five research questions were created to guide data collection for the study. These 
questions were as follows: 
1. What is the demographic profile of RNs sanctioned by the BNE? 
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2. What are the incidences of individual, health care team, patient, and 
system threats and types of errors as reported by sanctioned nurses? 
3. What are the incidences of the level of harm to the patient as reported 
by sanctioned nurses? 
4. What relationships exist between the types of errors and the level of 
harm to the patient as reported by sanctioned nurses? 
5. What changes in practice do RNs sanctioned by the BNE describe 
after the error event, and what suggestions do they have for other 
nurses in preventing error events? 
This exploratory study was conducted using a descriptive research design. 
Variables in the study included the following:  
1. Threats – Individual, health care team, patient, and system factors 
2. Errors – A breakdown in medication administration, documentation, 
attentiveness/surveillance, clinical evaluation, prevention, intervention, 
interpretation of doctors’ orders, and patient advocacy 
3. Patient Outcomes – Level of harm 
Surveys were sent to the entire population of 613 RNs who had received a 
sanction from the BNE for practice errors between December 2004 and December 2006. 
Sixty-two RNs responded to the survey. Because this was a descriptive study, data 
analysis included non-parametric statistics, most of which were frequencies. There was 
one Spearman’s rho correlation conducted to answer research question 4. Prominent 
themes from the respondents’ comments were identified in research question 5.  
Even though there was only a 10% response rate, overall, the demographics of the 
respondents reflected the population of the sanctioned nurses, indicating that the sample 
was representative of the population. The respondents identified system, health care team, 
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patient, and individual factors that contributed to their error events. Sixty-five percent of 
the respondents indicated that their error events did not harm the patient. Ten percent of 
the error events resulted in harm to the patient, 12% resulted in significant harm to the 
patient, and 14% resulted in patient death. There was a significant correlation between 
the level of patient harm and the errors Clinical Evaluation and 
Attentiveness/Surveillance. Open-ended questions revealed themes outlined in the 
modified TERCAP instrument in addition to other themes expressed by the participants.  
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The findings for each research question will be discussed. One component of this 
review was a comparison of this study’s findings with other similar research findings. 
However, the literature pertaining to disciplined nurses is limited. Six studies of 
disciplined nurses provided some comparative data. It is interesting to note that research 
regarding nursing errors is becoming more prevalent in the literature, particularly in more 
recent doctoral dissertations, and will be utilized in this chapter as appropriate.  
Research Question 1 
Research question 1 asked, “What is the demographic profile of RNs sanctioned 
by the BNE?” As noted in Chapter 4, the results of this study indicate that the majority of 
the survey respondents’ demographic data were reflective of the demographics of the 
total population of sanctioned nurses. The largest cohort of respondents reported that they 
were between the ages of 45 and 54 (38.7%). while an analysis indicated that the mean 
age was 47 years. Three studies of disciplined nurses in the 1990s reflected a somewhat 
younger cohort of nurses, with ages ranging from 35 to 40, except for one study that 
found a mean age of 44 years (Green, 1994; Booth & Carruth, 1998; Earle, 1996). Two 
studies conducted since 2000 reflect that the nurses involved had a mean age of 44, while 
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one study reported 49 as the mean age (LaDuke, 2000; Emrich, 2004; Mohar, 2006). 
Research studies indicate that disciplined nurses are aging. However, all nursing 
personnel are aging (Health Resources and Services Administration [HRSA], 2000; 
HRSA, 2003; Buerhaus, Doelan, Ulrich, Norman, & Dittus, 2006), and the aging 
population of disciplined nurses may well be an artifact of this phenomenon.  
The number of years an RN is licensed was also examined. The largest cohort of 
RNs in this study (20.9%) responded that they had been licensed between 5 and 10 years, 
with the next largest cohort (17.7%) being licensed between 11 and 15 years. The mean 
years of licensure was 14 years. Other studies about disciplined nurses indicate similar 
findings, and most report years of licensure ranging from 6 to 15 years at the time of the 
event (Green, 1994; Booth & Carruth, 1998; LaDuke, 2000; Emrich, 2004; Mohar, 2006). 
Only Earle’s study (1996) found that the majority of disciplined nurses were within 5 
years of licensure. The evidence that seasoned nurses have a greater propensity to make 
more errors than newly licensed nurses is counterintuitive. It seems logical that nurses 
with more years of practice would be more competent in their patient care and less likely 
to make errors resulting in discipline. However, competency may also be related to the 
number of years that nurses work for an employer. For instance, 76.0% of the nurses in 
this study reported being licensed for over 5 years, but 76% reported working in their 
agencies 5 or fewer years. Of these who had been employed for fewer than 5 years, 
27.0% reported that they had been in the agency for less than one year. Emrich’s study 
(2004) about disciplined nurses reflected a similar finding in that 80.0% of the nurses had 
been licensed for over 5 years, while 86.7% had been employed in their organizations for 
five or fewer years at the time of the error event. In addition, Green (1994) found that 
nurses were more likely to be disciplined if they had been with an employer for fewer 
than 3 years. It may be that in addition to competency gained through years of 
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employment with one employer, years of employment also reflect employer satisfaction 
and continued support for the nurse. In other words, employers may terminate nurses 
whom they deem incompetent rather than continue to work with them. Additionally, 
fewer years of employment also means fewer years to build effective collegial, trusting 
relationships that may help to mediate errors. A related finding in this study was that 
62.9% of the respondents reported being dismissed or asked to resign in lieu of 
termination after their error events. This high percentage of job separation due to an error 
event may be more common in the study’s population because the Texas Nursing 
Practice Act directs employers to report nurses to the BNE who have been dismissed for 
violations of the act (BNE, 2007a). However, such a large percentage was an unexpected 
finding. Employment tenure and other demographic variables such as age, years of 
licensure, and educational level and their relationships to nursing error merits further 
research.  
The majority of the study respondents (69.4%) reported working in a hospital 
setting, in keeping with the findings of other studies concerning disciplined nurses 
(Green, 1994; Earle, 1996; LaDuke, 2000), except for Emrich (2004), whose study found 
that the majority worked in a long-term care setting. Hospitals continue to compose the 
largest sector of employers (59.0%) for the total population of RNs in the United States 
(HRSA, 2000); therefore, the percentage of disciplined nurses working in hospital 
settings may reflect this employment demographic. 
Another important employment demographic that merits discussion is that 80.6% 
of the respondents in the study reported working directly with patients. Green’s earlier 
study of disciplined Texas nurses showed similar results in that 71.9% of the participants 
worked in direct patient care. Findings regarding direct patient care providers’ being 
more involved in patient errors are well documented and not surprising (IOM, 2000, 
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2004; Spath, 2000; Thomas & Houston, 2005; Benner et al., 2002; Benner et al., 2006). 
As discussed in Chapter 1, nurses are often the primary health care provider in the 
patient’s immediate and ongoing health care. It is the explicit nature of this close 
relationship (identified as an overt factor) that places the nurse at risk for making health 
care errors (IOM, 2001, 2004; Reason, 1990, 2000). This study has reviewed a new 
approach by utilizing the modified TERCAP to gain a better understanding of overt and 
latent factors, and it is surmised that a more holistic analysis will support nurses who 
provide direct patient care and are at the highest risk of being involved in an error event. 
Another example of an approach to examine overt and latent factors has been conducted 
by the Texas BNE, in conjunction with the Institute for Health Care Excellence at the 
M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, through the implementation of a pilot project that 
revamps the evaluation of a nurse’s error by conducting an in-depth analysis of system 
and individual factors (Thomas, Simmons, Graves, & Martin, 2007). Results of this study 
will also add to the body of knowledge about overt and latent factors as perceived by 
nurses who are at the most risk for making an error. 
The final demographic variable discussed is the educational level of the 
respondent. A report during the time of the study indicated that the total population of all 
RNs in Texas was composed of 70, 971 (39.0%) ADN-educated nurses and 64,966 
(36.0%) BSN-educated nurses. In the population of disciplined nurses within the BNE, 
53.8% had an ADN while 31.6% held a BSN, indicating an overrepresentation of ADNs. 
Likewise, there was an overrepresentation of ADNs (43.5%) in the study’s sample when 
compared with BSN-educated RNs (30.6%). All of the referenced studies on disciplined 
RNs reflect this overrepresentation of ADNs (Green, 1994; Earle, 1996; Booth & 
Carruth, 1998; LaDuke, 2000; Emrich, 2004; Mohar, 2006). The literature does not 
reflect research about the overrepresentation of ADNs in disciplined RNs. However, one 
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of the first studies to investigate differences in RN education was one by Aiken, Clark, 
Cheung, Sloane, and Silber (2003). Results of their study indicated that the educational 
level of RNs in hospitals is related to patient outcomes. They found that surgical patients 
had lower mortality rates when there were higher proportions of baccalaureate level 
nurses in the staffing mix. A study of critical thinking skills of Korean nursing students 
found that although all of the students’ average scores were lower than expected, 
baccalaureate students’ scores were significantly higher than the ADN and RN to BSN 
students (Shin, Jung, Shin, & Soo, 2006). However, in a study evaluating student values 
concerning professionalism, Martin, Yarbrough, and Alfred (2003) found that overall 
value orientation scores in graduating nursing students showed that ADN students’ scores 
were significantly higher than those of BSN students on 5 of the 11 subscales in the 
instrument.  
The variance in the ADN population in disciplinary studies may be because they 
are at the sharp end of the commission of error. More research is needed to understand 
this variance. As outlined in the BNE’s Standards of Practice and Unprofessional 
Conduct, personal and professional values for nurses are the foundation for safe patient 
care, and many nurses are disciplined for not meeting these standards. Studies by Aiken 
et al., (2003); Shin et al. (2006); and Martin et al. (2003) suggest that disciplinary issues 
with ADN nurses may be more a matter of competency than professional values. 
Historically, the educational preparation of RNs has been discussed within the context of 
the nursing shortage and access to education. The relative number of associate degree 
graduates is growing (HRSA, 2003), and though it is a politically charged issue, reasons 
for an overrepresentation of ADN-educated nurses in the disciplined population of nurses 
merits further research.  
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Research Question 2  
Research question 2asked, “What are the incidences of individual, health care 
team, patient, and system threats and types of errors as reported by sanctioned nurses?” 
Most of the factors identified by the respondents as contributions in their error events 
were System Factors (N = 144) and Health Care Team Factors (N = 149), as compared 
with Patient Factors (N = 86) and Individual Factors (N = 46). In those error events that 
involved some level of patient harm, System Factors (N = 46) and Health Care Team 
Factors (N = 42) also composed the majority of identified factors, while Patient Factors 
(N = 33) and Individual Factors (N =18) ranked lower. As outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, 
the preponderance of system and team factors contributing to error events identified in 
this study is supported by other patient safety research findings (IOM, 2001, 2004; 
Reason, 1990, 2000; Helmreich, 2000a; Helmreich, Wilhelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001; 
Scott, 2004; Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000; Thomas, 2000). Recent research on 
nursing perceptions about error events also supports the influence of system and health 
care team factors. For example, in a study of factors in a hospital setting that are related 
to nurses’ frequency of error reporting, Moody (2006) found that 70% of the nurses 
identified areas of improvement in teamwork, openness of communications, and 
nonpunitive responses to error. Another study by Hogan (2006) of 326 pediatric nurses’ 
perceptions of contributions to medication errors in acute care settings found issues with 
physicians, pharmacy, medication labeling, and systems factors such as staffing and 
interruptions.  
The most often identified Systems Factors in this study were those related to 
staffing (60%) and high work volume/stress (56%). This is an important finding in this 
research because these factors may reflect nurses’ inability to manage the high numbers 
and/or complexity of their patients and, as such, may be related to their error events. 
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Several studies suggest that patient outcomes are related to staffing and workload (Kane, 
Shamliyan, Mueller, Duval, & Wilt, 2007; Aiken et al., 2002; Blegen, Goode, & Reed, 
1998; Buerhaus et al., 2006). These types of studies were driven by the national focus on 
patient safety initiatives discussed in Chapter 1, and additional studies are needed to 
develop evidence-based solutions to staffing and workload patterns so nurses will have 
the resources needed to provide safe and effective care.  
Individual Factors were the least-often identified factors relating to the 
respondents’ error events. This is an interesting finding because it differs from the 
qualitative responses to the open-ended questions, which were rich in their descriptions 
of individual factors. Differences may have been due to the limited number and 
meaningfulness of items for individual factors on the modified TERCAP. For example, 
14 respondents checked “Other” regarding Individual Factors, while there were fewer 
“Other” selections in the System Factors and Health Care Team Factors. Denial of 
individual factors may also serve as a form of self-protection, particularly because some 
of the respondents indicated that the disciplinary process was traumatic. Finally, there 
may have been fewer items identified in Individual Factors because simply checking off 
a box may not adequately allow a nurse to explain her own limitations in performing 
patient care. 
Of those respondents who did identify an individual factor, fatigue was most often 
cited as the problem. Nursing and medical studies have provided evidence that fatigue 
does contribute to patient errors (Rogers, Hwang, Scott, Aiken, & Dinges, 2004; Jagsi et 
al., 2005; Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000). However, in a study of fatigue among 
sanctioned nurses (N = 117), Thomas (2005) found that 74% denied having feelings of 
fatigue at the time of their error events. This study contradicts the earlier findings by 
Thomas (2005) suggesting that fatigue is a factor identified by sanctioned nurses as 
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contributing to practice-related errors. It should be noted that the differences between the 
results of the two studies may be due to differences in how the questions were worded or 
could be due to the different populations that were surveyed (the 2005 study questioned 
nurses who were being investigated, while this study questioned nurses who had already 
received a disciplinary sanction).  
It may be premature to incorporate evidence-based research on nursing fatigue 
into regulatory policy. For example, in January 2007, the Texas BNE developed a draft 
position statement on fatigue based on patient safety research that recommends that 
nurses work no more than 60 hours a week or three consecutive12-hour shifts (BNE, 
2007b). Before adopting the position statement, the board solicited feedback from 
stakeholders. Eleven thousand stakeholders responded to the Web site survey, and 
approximately 200 sent additional e-mails. Ninety-five percent indicated that the BNE 
should not regulate nursing work hours, and 88% indicated that employers should not 
regulate nursing work hours (BNE, 2007b). Some of the reasons given for not supporting 
the position statement were based on issues with the nursing shortage and not interfering 
with nurses’ right to work (BNE, 2007b).  
Another interesting finding was that the respondents often mentioned physical 
health issues even though there wasn’t a specific item on the modified TERCAP related 
to physical health. Physical health issues may be related to the overall aging of the 
nursing population or it may be related to the physical work involved in direct patient 
care. The addition of this item to the modified TERCAP may facilitate more information 
to investigate this finding further.  
Types of errors were also examined in this study. Respondents indicated that the 
majority (63.0%) of errors in the modified TERCAP did not contribute to their error 
events. However, 36.0% of the errors were reported as either moderately or greatly 
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contributing to the error event. Of these, Documentation (53.8%) and Medication 
Administration (44.2%) were the most frequently selected types of errors that contributed 
to the respondents’ error events. The prominence of these two types of errors could be 
due to the other error categories’ being more nebulous or difficult to define. For instance, 
it seems that judging whether one made a medication error is much clearer than judging 
whether one had a breakdown in clinical evaluation and/or prevention. The respondents 
did choose other categories; however, responses to these other categories were fairly 
evenly distributed, and they were ranked lower (26.9% to 36.5%) than Documentation 
and Medication Administration. The prevalence of these two error categories in this study 
suggest that health care organizations should examine work processes and quality 
improvement activities related to documentation and medication administration.  
Research Question 3 
Research question 3 asks, “What are the incidences of the level of harm as 
reported by sanctioned nurses?” There were four levels of harm in the patient harm index: 
no harm, harm, significant harm, and death. In this study, 13% of the nurses reported 
errors that may have contributed to the patient’s death, while 12% reported errors that 
caused significant patient harm, resulting in 25% of the total reported error events that 
may have contributed to significant harm or patient death. This percentage is higher than 
other studies of disciplined nurses. For example, in Emrich’s study (2004) of 30 nurses 
disciplined in Ohio, the author indicated that 90% of the errors did not cause patient 
harm. Mohar (2006), in a study of 878 RNs disciplined in Washington, reported that there 
were 22 patient deaths (3%). In a study of 235,159 medication errors, the MEDMARX 
database outlined that only 0.01 of the errors resulted in a patient’s death, while 
permanent or life-threatening harm occurred in only approximately 0.05 of the reported 
error cases (Hicks, Santell, et al., 2004). As outlined in Chapter 1, the IOM Report To 
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ErrIis Human projected between 44,000 to 98,000 deaths annually due to medical error 
(IOM, 2000). However, the institute’s methodology has been challenged by the Texas 
Medical Association (Ortolon, 2000). The author claims that the IOM report had serious 
methodological issues when the researchers extrapolated mortality from data that was 
“old” and limited to three states. Ortolon also argued that trends in medical errors from 
sources included in the IOM report have actually decreased from 4.6% in 1977 to 2.9% in 
1992, with the numbers for patient deaths showing the most improvement. Such 
arguments over how to estimate the number of patient deaths resulting from medical error 
reflect the infancy of patient safety science.  
Error rates and subsequent patient outcomes are still not systematically evaluated 
on a national scale, and methodologies vary state by state (IOM, 2000). This is partially 
due to not having valid, effective measurement tools (Health Grades, 2006), while some 
cite lack of funding and political initiatives to drive research and policy development 
(Zwillich, 2004). Numerous studies have been conducted on medical errors since the 
initial IOM report, but recent studies of hospitals indicate that progress is slow, results are 
modest, and there is still a gap in the achievement of the best possible care (Health 
Grades, 2006).  
Why there was such a large percentage of patient death or significant patient harm 
reported by the respondents in this study is not clear. One factor may be the mandatory 
reporting laws in Texas that mandate the reporting of serious patient harm, making it 
likely that nurses sanctioned by the BNE will have more serious patient outcomes than 
nondisciplined nurses. The other two studies of disciplined nurses’ errors and patient 
outcomes (Emrich, 2004; Mohar, 2006) pertained to the researchers’ case reviews within 
boards of nursing. These studies, however, solicited information directly from the 
disciplined RNs. One may speculate that RNs involved in an error event that significantly 
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harmed or contributed to a patient’s death felt more compelled to respond to the survey 
due to personal and professional reasons. 
Research Question 4 
Research question 4 asks, “What relationships exist between the types of errors 
and the level of harm to the patient as reported by sanctioned nurses?” A Spearman’s rho 
correlation was conducted between patient outcomes and types of errors. There were 
significant relationships between the level of patient harm and two types of errors: 
Clinical Evaluation (0.348, p = 0.05) and Attentiveness/Surveillance (0.308, p = 0.05). 
Though all of the error types could cause patient harm, these two reflect a breakdown in 
the essence of nursing practice. Benner et al. (2002) describe the methodology in the 
development of a taxonomy of nursing practice errors in the TERCAP. The category 
Clinical Evaluation was originally named Inappropriate Judgment. The article reiterates 
that nurses pursue solutions to problems through their understanding of the clinical 
situation. Several types of inappropriate judgments can occur, including inadequate 
assessment, faulty logic, and a lack of understanding of signs and symptoms. In 
describing the category Attentiveness, Benner et al. (2002) clarify that a breakdown in 
this component of nursing practice is particularly relevant to patient safety because 
nurses’ attention to patients can identify potential hazards or errors in treatment. 
Attentiveness or lack thereof can lead to a phenomenon called failure to rescue when 
nurses do not intervene and initiate activities for the patients when their clinical condition 
merits intervention (Benner et al., 2006). This study’s findings of significant relationships 
between Clinical Evaluation and Attentiveness/Surveillance and the level of patient harm 
suggest that these error types are worthy of further investigation and research.  
As with prior studies, this study found that the majority of errors did not harm the 
patient. This finding is supported by other research (IOM, 2000; Hicks, Santell, et al., 
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2004) and is not surprising. What is surprising is that of the errors that did cause harm, 
there were more reported errors that caused significant harm or death than errors that 
caused only minor harm. It may be that for the RNs who were involved in an error event 
that caused serious patient harm or death, the impact of the event was such that they had 
better recall than those RNs whose errors resulted in minor harm. Or it may be that these 
RNs felt more compelled to respond to research regarding patient safety. The IOM 
suggested investigating nursing error and patient harm (IOM, 2004), and this research 
study is a response to that call.  
Research Question 5  
5.  Research question 5 asks, “What changes in practice do RNs sanctioned by the 
BNE describe after the error event, and what suggestions do they have for other 
nurses in preventing error events?” 
Responses to Research Question Five were solicited through two open-ended 
questions. The first asked, “Did this event change your nursing practice, and if so, how?” 
and the second question asked, “Based on what you have learned from the event, what 
suggestions would you pass on to help other nurses prevent practice breakdown and/or 
error events?” Fifty-five (88%) of the respondents commented on the first question and 
53 (85%) on the second, and they gave 170 comments, providing the opportunity to 
develop common themes. Comments were initially analyzed by utilizing the modified 
TERCAP template to develop themes. Responses fit within all of the modified TERCAP 
headings except that no one responded to System Factors when discussing changes in 
their own practice. However, there were 10 comments regarding System Factors in 
suggestions to other nurses. It is interesting to note that respondents gave other nurses 
suggestions about addressing system factors but did not address this in their own practice. 
Perhaps they view their own practice more introspectively and within the context of their 
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own strengths and limitations, whereas they may think more expansively when advising 
other nurses.  
In addition to the themes within the modified TERCAP, other themes emerged. 
For example, the word trust was very prevalent in the comments, and several themes 
about trust emerged. In response to the question about changes in their practice, several 
respondents described a lack of trust about themselves and team members as well as 
global mistrust of other staff and the profession in general. Many of the statements were 
emotional in nature and indicated that the nurses were treated as outsiders and were often 
unsure of themselves, making them more cautious in their practice. Other emotive 
statements were made by some of the respondents regarding conflict within the team. 
Similar findings were noted by LaDuke (2000), Booth and Carruth (1998), and Green 
(1994), who reported participants’ feelings of lack of trust as well as a sense of shame 
and anger.  
Of interest is that there were just as many comments about changes in practice 
that led to the respondents’ having more trust since the error event. Themes emerging 
from these comments indicate that respondents had experienced a change since the error 
event and were now empowered to take charge of their practice. For example, the theme 
Increased Self-Reliance, reflecting the sub-themes I trust myself to do the right thing and 
If I don’t feel confident I don’t do it, were made. This sense of empowerment was also 
reflected by respondents whose comments formed the themes Increased My Education, 
Slowed Down and Reduced Stress, Know and Follow the Rules, and Humbled/ Know I 
Can’t Handle It All, all of which indicate that the respondents identified changes that 
were needed in their practice. LaDuke (2000) Booth and Carruth (1998), and Green 
(1994) also reported similar findings of empowerment. For instance, Green found that 
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many nurses were optimistic about their future, while Booth and Carruth found that being 
disciplined ultimately proved to be a positive experience for the nurses.  
One might speculate that nurses who were terminated or asked to resign by their 
employers due to the error events might feel less confident in their abilities. Conversely, 
however, of the 11 respondents whose comments reflected increased self-reliance, all but 
one reported that they were either terminated or asked to resign. Of the 9 RNs whose 
comments reflected a reduced sense of self-confidence, over half (5) were not terminated 
or asked to resign. These findings suggest that termination following an error event may 
not, over the long term, negatively affect the nurses’ self-confidence. However, it was not 
known how much time had passed from the respondents’ experience of dismissal to the 
time they received the survey, and the passage of time may have changed their 
perceptions. In addition, the consequences of the sanction may have caused them to 
reframe the situation and learn from the event. This finding may also be due to sample 
bias in that those who experienced increased self-reliance, whether or not they were 
terminated from their employment, were more apt to respond.  
Another finding is that when responding to items in the modified TERCAP, the 
participants identified system and health care team factors three times as often as 
individual factors. Yet, when respondents were given the opportunity to discuss the error 
event in response to open-ended question regarding changes in their practice, their 
comments were prolific and multifaceted. As previously discussed, this may be due to the 
limited number of items for individual factors in the modified TERCAP. However, by 
providing a mechanism to allow discussion of individual factors in their own words, it 
may be that the respondents were able to provide a more reflective, comprehensive self-
analysis. 
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Though several respondents indicated that they had issues with trust and conflict, 
only four respondents wrote comments indicating that they had no part in the error event 
and that it was someone else’s fault. Booth and Carruth (1998) found that nurses who 
denied any fault had less insight about the incident and, if given another chance, may not 
know how to avoid the mistake. Though it is possible that a nurse might be set up to 
“take the fall,” as one respondent put it, very few nurses suggested they were blameless.  
Eleven RNs (18%) indicated that they had left the nursing profession. Many of 
their comments suggested that the events devastated them personally as well as 
professionally. Bankruptcy, low-paying jobs, and emotional sequela were some of their 
reported outcomes. LaDuke’s (2000) study had similar findings describing nurses’ losses 
of jobs, homes, friends, and financial stability after discipline by a board of nursing. 
Understandably, there were no comments related to increased self-reliance from these 
nurses. However, four of these RNs did suggest that other nurses use self-protective 
measures. An analysis of the findings also reflected that 8 of the 11 RNs who left nursing 
were terminated or asked to resign in lieu of termination, suggesting that the error events 
ended their careers in nursing. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
This study was limited to RNs licensed in Texas and sanctioned by the Texas 
BNE; consequently, the results cannot be generalized to the population of sanctioned 
RNs in the United States. The low response rate also could have contributed to a non-
representative sample. Because these RNs had been sanctioned by the BNE, they may 
have experienced shame, anger, and embarrassment, leading to responses that may not 
have been objective or accurate and that may have been self serving (Streiner & Norman, 
2004). The sample was selected from a database of nurses who had been disciplined 
between December 2004 and December 2006. Responses from the RNs disciplined in 
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late 2004 or early 2005 may have been quite different from those of RNs who had been 
more recently disciplined. For example, the adage that “time heals all wounds” may have 
influenced those respondents with earlier sanctions to be more reflective and accepting 
than nurses with a more recent discipline experience. The difference in the number of 
years that had passed since the sanction by the BNE may also have perpetuated recall 
bias.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of this study indicate that the TEMM may provide a conceptual 
model for the evaluation of threats to patient safety through the identification of 
individual, health care team, patient, and system factors that contribute to nursing error. 
Because the TERCAP was originally developed for investigators at boards of nursing, the 
instrument was modified for this study. Some of the RNs who reviewed the instrument 
for modifications voiced concerns about negative wording such as practice breakdown 
instead of error event. This review process highlighted the impact of language on 
potential participants, and subsequent changes were made by the researcher before the 
study was conducted to modify the instrument in order to incorporate concepts within the 
TERCAP but also to ensure that the items would not offend and would solicit a response.  
Respondents selected individual, health care team, patient, and system factors that 
contributed to their error events. System and Health Care Team Factors were the most 
common items selected as contributing to the error events, while Individual Factors were 
the least often selected items. However, given the opportunity to discuss individual 
factors through open-ended questions, responses were comprehensive. It is likely that 
these reflections were facilitated by allowing the respondents to use their own words in 
describing individual factors contributing to the error events. Subsequently, the value of 
using the items in the Individual Factors section of the modified TERCAP to capture 
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perceptions of RNs about their individual contributions to the error events is limited. 
Regarding patient factors that contributed to the error event; among the most commonly 
selected factors were those that affected communication between the RN and the patient. 
This finding could play a role in the development of methodologies for patient acuity 
systems that could allow more nursing time for patients who have difficulty 
communicating with their caretakers.  
The most common types of errors identified by respondents were related to 
documentation and medication errors. The respondents indicated that the majority of the 
errors did not cause patient harm; however, the reported incidences of patient death and 
significant harm were higher than expected. There were also significant relationships 
between the level of patient harm and the errors Clinical Evaluation and 
Attentiveness/Surveillance, indicating that breakdowns in these two aspects of nursing 
practice were related to patient outcomes.  
Using their own words to describe changes in their practice since the error events, 
respondents’ comments were comprehensive and emotive, particularly around issues of 
trust. Many of the respondents wrote about how they trusted themselves more since the 
error event to make the necessary changes to practice safely. Other comments reflected a 
lack of trust in themselves and others. Several left the profession because of the error 
event and sanction by the board. These responses indicate that although many of the 
respondents understood their contributions to the errors, being involved in an error event 
and subsequent sanction by a board of nursing is an emotionally charged experience and 
that those emotions should be anticipated by boards of nursing, employers of nurses, and 
nurses themselves.  
Respondents also described how they would change their practice regarding 
specific types of errors, most frequently describing improvements in documentation. The 
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frequency of comments about documentation and the corresponding frequency of error 
related to documentation in the modified TERCAP suggest that this is an important issue 
for sanctioned nurses. This may partially be a result of the investigation process by the 
BNE, where documentation serves as evidence in evaluating a nurse’s response to 
reported allegations of unsafe practice.  
The finding that the majority of the respondents were able to discuss specific 
changes in their practice is important. Positive or negative, these comments can provide 
direction for further study on board remediation processes. All of the findings of the 
study provide the perspectives of sanctioned RNs who have been intimately involved in 
an error event. This perspective has provided multidimensional findings to support the 
development of new, evidence-based approaches to patient safety.  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NURSING THEORY 
The simplicity of the constructs within the TEMM as presented in Appendix A 
was very beneficial in providing a heuristic framework for examining the variables of 
interest. However, the more detailed representation of the model in Appendix B was not 
as helpful in guiding the study for two reasons. First, the concepts outlined in constructs 
were not supported by the patient literature reviewed for this study; and second, the 
framework provided by the TERCAP instrument (developed by and for nurses) provided 
a better conceptual approach for guiding data analysis. For example, the taxonomy of 
error in the TERCAP was specifically developed for nursing practice errors and was 
much more pertinent to this study than the taxonomy outlined in the TEMM. For future 
theoretical development, the constructs of the TEMM could be utilized as a template for 
further model development, which could utilize concepts found within the TERCAP. Due 
to the sensitivity of the language in the instrument, this study posed factors rather than 
threats that contributed to error events. Future research could explore the nuances 
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between these concepts and whether sanctioned nurses viewed these factors as threats. 
Findings from this study about the contributions to error events could provide a 
foundation for future research into the management strategies and countermeasures 
identified in the TEMM. These strategies could be explored specifically for nursing 
personnel or for all of the health care team, such as was done in the work that has been 
conducted by Eric Thomas and colleagues (Thomas, 2000).  
Modifications to the instrument for this study may contribute to beneficial 
revisions for the TERCAP. For instance, because physical health was frequently 
identified in the “other” section of Individual Factors, this may be an important item to 
include. In addition, adding open ended questions also may provide a much more 
comprehensive analysis of remediation strategies. 
Further research is needed to investigate how to integrate a multifactored 
approach to error evaluation. Historically, individual contributions to error events have 
been readily analyzed, and evidence for the inclusion of system, patient, and health care 
team factors may be needed for health care organizations to adopt this model. Because of 
the complexity of the construct of system factors, more research is needed to develop 
concepts that promote a comprehensive and systematic analysis of system variables.  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NURSING POLICY 
The mission of all health professional regulatory boards is to license and monitor 
health care professionals’ practice for the purposes of patient safety. Because these 
boards’ purview is over the licensee, they are very familiar with reviewing individual 
factors involved in error events. Patient safety research, including this study, shows that 
organizational attributes may also contribute to patient errors, and boards of nursing are 
responding by modifying and developing new methodologies for investigations. An 
evidence-based model designed to investigate the multidimensional aspects of error 
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events would promote a more comprehensive, global review for methods that promote 
patient safety. Because nursing regulatory boards have no purview over systems, health 
care teams, or patients, the challenge will be in developing political and legal structures 
to allow regulatory bodies to explore all of these factors. The BNE’s Patient Safety Pilot 
is an example of such a structure.  
This study found that if given an opportunity to describe changes that were 
needed in their practice, RNs will do so. As regulatory boards develop remediation 
strategies for nurses involved in practice error events, it may be pertinent to also obtain 
the nurses’ input on what strategies they think will help them become more competent 
practitioners. This study also found that being involved in an error event and sanctioned 
by a board of nursing is likely to result in nurses’ either overcoming the experience and 
becoming more self-reliant in their practice or being devastated by the event and losing 
self-confidence and trust. Gaining a better understanding of the factors that promote self-
reliance would greatly assist in remediation strategies. If it is clear that an RN’s practice 
should be terminated, it is suggested that regulatory bodies develop anticipatory strategies 
to facilitate avenues for dealing with this traumatic event. Ensuring that nurses 
understand the laws and regulations that guide their practice is essential. One way this is 
being accomplished in Texas is through a mandate from the legislature that requires the 
BNE to implement a nursing jurisprudence exam for new graduates of nursing programs. 
Lastly, regulatory boards should develop information systems such as the TERCAP to 
provide meaningful information in order to educate nurses and the public in order to 
understand and prevent error events.  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NURSING PRACTICE 
Nursing administrators and peer review committees should review all of the 
factors involved in an error event. The challenge will be in educating stakeholders about 
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the multidimensional aspect of error events. In JCAHO-credentialed hospitals, this 
review is usually conducted within a root cause analysis. However, this information is 
privileged, and many institutions will not share findings with boards of nursing. If boards 
of nursing are going to evaluate the multiple factors involved in a nurse’s error, they must 
have access to this institutional information. Research findings about nurses and issues 
with staffing and high work volumes are not new and will probably not surprise nursing 
administrators. However, this study shows that issues with staffing and high work 
volumes were the most frequently identified system contributions to nursing errors. The 
importance of administrators’ implementing staffing and workload patterns that promote 
safe, effective nursing care for their patients cannot be overstated. When investigating 
workload patterns, a priority should be the development of documentation processes that 
capture essential patient care information. The good news is that technological advances 
are becoming more apparent in the patient safety literature, and all members of the health 
care team should benefit from these developments.  
Though it may be a challenge because of competing priorities, nursing educators 
should ensure that the nursing curricula contain information about the etiology and 
management of nursing errors. Graduates should enter the nursing profession with an 
understanding that being a “perfect” nurse will not necessarily ensure patient safety, and 
they should be equipped with evidence-based strategies to identify and mediate the 
factors involved in error events.  
Nurses in practice should have knowledge of human factors science so they 
understand the etiology of error events. Utilizing a model that investigates individual as 
well as other factors that contribute to errors may help promote morale and a sense of 
fairness in nursing staff. Understanding the multidimensional nature of error events 
should promote the nurse’s ability to identify all of the factors and implement mediating 
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strategies. Being able to understand, address, and change system factors will be the 
primary challenge for many staff nurses. This is why the involvement of the health care 
facility’s leadership is critical to the success of systems that promote patient safety. 
Nurses on the front line often understand the hidden issues that need to be addressed for 
safer systems; the question will be whether the organization’s leadership can implement 
fair, equitable, and fiscally responsive solutions. 
It is imperative that nurses understand the laws and regulations that govern their 
practice, the most important being their duty to the patient. They should not depend on 
their employers to interpret these regulations or believe that facility policy is always in 
the best interest of the patient. Nurses should take note from their colleagues in this study 
who indicated that they had learned to trust themselves to do the right thing and did not 
do something they were not confident in doing. At the same time, nurses should also 
learn how to work with their employers to implement cost-effective, quality-based 
solutions to the problems they encounter in their practice.  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NURSING RESEARCH 
The demographics of sanctioned RNs in this and other studies suggest that these 
nurses have been licensed for several years and are aging along with the entire RN 
population in the United States. Research should be conducted to ascertain whether there 
are any individual factors related to aging that may contribute to error events. This study 
and other studies regarding disciplined nurses suggest there is an overrepresentation of 
ADN-educated nurses. It is possible that ADN-educated RNs may be more likely to be in 
direct patient care positions, which would place them at higher risk for making a practice 
error and being reported to a board of nursing. Further research should explore and 
evaluate the reasons that ADNs are more prevalent in the disciplined RN population. This 
study found positive correlations between reported breakdowns in two types of nursing 
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practice, Clinical Evaluation and Attentiveness/Surveillance, and the level of patient 
harm. Further research is needed to evaluate whether or not these relationships are causal. 
 Other areas for research include implementing a systems approach to testing 
interventions that improve communication, build trust and enhance team functioning and 
if these improvements relate to the commission of health care errors. Additionally, further 
research about relationships between patient outcomes such as morbidity and mortality 
and the multiple factors identified in this study could provide new knowledge for the 
development of patient safety programs. 
CONCLUSION SUMMARY 
This chapter provides a summary of the purpose, research questions, 
methodology, and findings. The findings for each research question were reviewed along 
with limitations of the findings and conclusions. Finally, recommendations for nursing 
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